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Investor confidence in financial markets depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime 
that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of publicly listed companies. This is 
particularly true for corporate governance systems that are characterized by concentrated ownership. On the one hand, 
large investors with significant voting and cash-flow rights may encourage long-term growth and firm performance. 
On the other hand, however, controlling beneficial owners with large voting blocks may have incentives to divert 
corporate assets and opportunities for personal gain at the expense of minority investors.  
This paper does not only concern the protection of minority investors. It also takes the interests of other 
stakeholders and society as a whole into account. The paper focuses particularly on the misuse of corporate vehicles, 
which arguably poses a major challenge to good corporate governance. Stakeholder rights (e.g. employees and 
creditors) cannot be properly exercised if ultimate decision makers in a company‟s affairs cannot be identified. The 
accountability of the board may also be seriously endangered if stakeholders and the general public are unaware of 
decision-making and ultimate control structures. Finally, regulators and supervisory agencies have a strong interest to 
know beneficial owners – in order to determine the origin of investment flows, to prevent money laundering and tax 
evasion and to settle issues of corporate accountability. 
A good corporate governance infrastructure should combine transparency, accountability and integrity and this 
requires knowledge of beneficial ownership. The protection of minority investors and other stakeholder protection 
will be challenging without access to reliable information about the ownership, including the identity of the 
controlling owners, and control structures of listed companies. In this respect, this paper makes three major claims 
about the nature and scope of the disclosure and reporting regime.  
The first claim is that it is crucial for the functioning and development of financial markets that there is a strong 
regime of proportionate measures to identify beneficial ownership through disclosure and investigation mechanisms. 
The second claim in this paper is that, in order to provide minority investors with adequate information about the 
ownership structure of a publicly listed company, it is key that control-enhancing mechanisms, which give controlling 
investors voting/control rights in excess of their cash-flow rights, are disclosed on a regular basis. The final claim is 
that the disclosure regime should be supplemented with a mix of public and private investigation and enforcement 
mechanisms, which encourage beneficial owners to effectively make disclosures and inform the company, other 
investors and the market about the control structure and their intentions. In the spirit of finding the right mix, 
governments should introduce and develop non-judicial, informal enforcement mechanisms, such as “information 
requests” and private and public reprimands.  
The disclosure and enforcement regime should be designed to give governments and regulators the opportunity 
to respond quickly to alternative investment techniques, such as cash-settled equity derivatives. On the other hand, 
legitimate majority shareholding should not be deterred from taking an active role in monitoring management in listed 
companies. For the functioning of financial markets that have become increasingly internationally oriented and 
complex, it is essential that legal rules and requirements that enable information sharing on an international level be 
available and effectively implemented by national supervisory authorities. 
Keywords: beneficial ownership, control-enhancing mechanisms, corporate governance, disclosure, inside 
blockholders, money laundering, outside blockholders, private enforcement, public enforcement, 
shareholders 
JEL Classifications: G30, G32, K22, K42 
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Beneficial Ownership and Control: A Comparative Study 





 This paper has been requested by Bapepam-LK, the Capital Market and Financial Institution 
Supervisory Agency in Indonesia, in the context of the OECD-Indonesia policy dialogue on disclosure of 
beneficial ownership and control, launched in Bali on 5 October 2011.
3
 The objective is to support policy 
makers and regulators in their efforts to enhance disclosure and enforcement of beneficial ownership and 
control as part of overall efforts to improve corporate governance standards and practices in Indonesia. The 
expected impact is: facilitate a comparative analysis of how disclosure of beneficial ownership is handled 
by other jurisdictions; highlight the costs, benefits and practicality of various approaches.  
 Corporate governance is important for the efficient functioning of markets and enterprises, in 
accordance with the overall goals of communities and societies. An effective and sustainable corporate 
governance infrastructure helps promote investor confidence and assists firms in meeting investors‟ 
expectations. It also helps regulators to deal effectively with systemic issues and stakeholders to play their 
roles within the company. It is based on accountability and integrity of corporate boards. The financial 
crisis has dramatically highlighted these issues and policy makers and stakeholders once more bemoaned 
the absence of a corporate governance infrastructure that adequately protects shareholders and other 
stakeholders in listed companies.
4
 There is often a lack of clear solutions for (potential) conflicts in listed 
companies caused by concentrated ownership and control. Concentrated ownership or blockholder 
structures have always been the predominant corporate structure and are not illegitimate if proper 
governance rules are in place. This means that corporate control structures have to operate within a 
framework of transparency. It is widely acknowledged that disguised control structures and misuse of 
corporate vehicles cannot be tolerated. 
 The accumulation of control in one or more shareholders may very well benefit minority 
investors by making management more accountable, thereby reducing managerial self-dealing problems.
5
 
However, controlling shareholders also have incentives to exploit corporate opportunities and engage in 
abusive related party transactions. The question thus arises whether a country‟s corporate governance 
infrastructure is sufficient to protect minority investors and other stakeholders against opportunistic 
behavior of controlling beneficial owners. 
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(1) Critically assesses the legal and regulatory regimes and practices governing the disclosure and 
reporting of ownership and control structures in listed companies in various countries and regions 
around the world. We focus on the European Union, and the implementation of its rules in France 
and Italy, the United States, and Asia (Indonesia, China and Malaysia). We attempt to assess to 
what extent and through which channels relevant ownership and control information is reported 
and provided to the company and its investors, the market and regulators and supervisory 
authorities.  
(2) Reviews the strategies that are employed to enforce the legal regimes and practices. We observe 
several instruments through which public agents and private economic actors may initiate 
investigation and enforcement measures to ensure that listed companies and their investors abide 
by the existing disclosure and reporting rules and regulations. It leads to the question of which 
instruments are most appropriate and least disruptive to an effective functioning of the financial 
market.  
(3) Considers a number of policy recommendations and evaluates the impact they may have on a 
country‟s corporate governance infrastructure and, more importantly, on a country‟s business 
community. The information about the legal regimes and practices, including their enforcement, 
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1. CHALLENGES FOR POLICY MAKERS AND REGULATORS 
1.1 Inside and outside ownership: costs and benefits 
 Policy makers and regulators are again concerned with designing a corporate governance 
framework that is better able to protect investors from misbehaviour and self-interested managers and 
controlling shareholders. The debate focuses on the principal-agent relationship between those with actual 
control over the company and minority investors, stakeholders, such as employees, customers and 
suppliers, and society in general.  
 In so-called market systems, which are characterized by widely dispersed, small and numerous 
shareholdings, liquid trading markets, the emphasis of the discussion is mainly on creating mechanisms 
that are intended to curtail agency problems between self-interested management and passive investors.
7
 
These problems can largely be explained by the “vertical agency relationship” in which the managers are 
the agents and the shareholders are the principals (see Figure 1). The agency problems in market systems 
stem from shareholders being passive and not at all engaged in monitoring and, if necessary, disciplining 
management. In economic jargon, the “separation of ownership and control” provides management with 
the opportunity to use superior information about a company‟s strategies, policies and prospects 
opportunistically and self-interestedly, without the risk of being detected.  
 In concentrated ownership or blockholder systems, found in many variations in Europe, Asia and 
most other capitalists economies, the magnitude of the “vertical agency problem” is mitigated because 
some investors tend to have larger stakes in listed companies and hence have more incentives to monitor 
and discipline management. Here, one should distinguish between two types of listed firms in blockholder 
systems.  
 Firstly, there are listed companies, such as most institutional investor “controlled” companies, in 
which the substantial voting rights and cash-flow rights are identical and based on the proportion of total 
shares held. These investors, generally referred to as “outside blockholders”, make listed companies prone 
to a three-way conflict between controlling shareholders, managers and minority shareholders. Since 
outside blockholders usually mitigate the problems related to managerial opportunism, it is not surprising 
that policy makers and regulators focus on possible conflicts that may occur in the “horizontal agency 
relationship” between outside blockholders and passive minority investors.
8
 To see this, note that in the 
current financial world, which is typically characterized by high frequency trading and rapid and 
continuous changes in share ownership, institutional investors are inclined to focus on short-term returns.
9
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9
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Matter?, Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics 2011-2 Working Paper (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1860144). 
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 The legal framework of a listed company provides parties with a differentiated management and control structure in 
which shareholders elect directors and participate in certain fundamental decisions, and directors establish 
policies, select managers, perform monitoring functions, and act as the company‟s agents. Because the 
controlling shareholder elects the directors, they are usually able to practically control the management and 
supervision of a listed company.  
 8 
 
Figure 1: Agency problems in blockholder systems 
 For example, recent research shows that before the financial crisis was imminent, powerful 
institutional investors encouraged managers of their portfolio companies to pursue more risky and 
opportunistic growth strategies in order to spur short-term shareholder returns.
11
 The fact that outside 
blockholders, due to more advanced trading practices and technologies, increasingly use derivative 
instruments and short-selling techniques in order to make profits just adds to the “horizontal agency 
problem” between outside blockholders and minority investors.
12
 
 Secondly, there are listed companies, such as many family-owned - and sometimes even state-
owned - companies, with inside blockholders, who actually hold management positions or serve on the 
board of directors of the companies they invest in (see Figure 1).
13
 “Vertical agency problems” are 
irrelevant, but “horizontal agency problems” abound in listed companies with inside blockholders. The 
controlling shareholders may employ several strategies to extract resources and assets from firms they 
control, thereby significantly increasing the horizontal agency costs. These include: (1) dilutive share 
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 See D.H. Erkens, M. Hung and P.P. Matos, Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence 
from Financial Institutions Worldwide, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 249/2009. 
12
 When institutional investors sell short, they sell borrowed shares under the expectation that they will be able to buy 
the shares back in the market at a lower price. 
13
 See C.G. Holderness, A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, April 
2003.  
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issues, (2) insider trading, (3) withholding important information, (4) allocation of corporate opportunities 
and business activities, and (5) related party transactions.  
 A simple example illustrates the possible expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders who engage in related party transactions either directly or through one or more of their 
subsidiaries. Imagine that a shareholder owns 51% of the voting shares in company A and that this 
shareholder also owns 100% of the outstanding shares of company B. If company A is a supplier of 
company B, the controlling shareholder may be tempted to reduce the transfer price of products sold and 
delivered to company B. This way profits are maximized in company B, which the shareholder controls 
and, more importantly, owns all the cash-flow rights of, while profits are minimized in company A at the 
expense of the minority shareholders. As the example shows, the key concern about related party 
transactions is that they may not be undertaken at market prices, calling for strict disclosure and reporting 




1.2 The importance of “strict” disclosure and reporting mechanisms 
 There is a wide array of legal mechanisms designed to prevent or restrict corporate actions that 
may lead to opportunistic behaviour by blockholders. For instance, pre-emption rights in company law 
statutes give all shareholders in a company the right to be offered any newly issued shares before the 
shares are offered to either non-shareholders or one or more of the existing shareholders. Because the offer 
of new shares to existing shareholders must usually be made on a pro-rata basis, this legal provision 
prevents that blockholders expropriate the interests of minority investors by initiating dilutive share issues.  
 Another example of legal provisions that regulate potentially self-dealing transactions can be 
found in the listing rules of several Asian countries. The listing rules of the Hong Kong and Singapore 
stock exchanges, for instance, insist that material related party transactions are put to a vote by the minority 
shareholders of listed companies, providing them with information and control over expropriation 
attempts. 
 No matter how effective these mechanisms are, they are not by themselves a sufficient remedy 
for the legal and regulatory challenges raised by concentrated ownership and blockholders. Indeed, 
minority investors must have means to monitor and observe blockholders‟ behaviour in order to detect 
possible opportunism and expropriation at an early stage. Therefore, the existence of an accurate disclosure 
and reporting regime that provides transparency in the ownership and control structures of publicly listed 
companies is considered as the linchpin of an effective corporate governance infrastructure. This 
conclusion is not new to policy makers and regulators.
15
 Most jurisdictions passed legislation mandating 
shareholders to disclose and report the accumulation of a substantial ownership of shares. The reporting 
requirement includes the ownership of bearer shares, which is often still considered legal and appropriate. 
Bearer shares are normally not registered in a shareholders register, making it almost impossible to quickly 
determine the identity of the shareholders. To be sure, registration with the company is often necessary if 
holders of bearer shares intend to vote or want to receive dividends. Without effective disclosure and 
reporting requirements, however, bearer shares would enable shareholders to secretly acquire potential 
control over a listed company, thereby facilitating market manipulation and abusive tactics.  
                                                     
14
 It should be noted that related party transactions play an important and legitimate role in a market economy. For 
firms, trade and foreign investments are often facilitated by inter-company financing transactions. Lower 
costs of capital and tax savings provide a strong incentive for engaging in related party transactions. 
Indeed, there are many examples of related party transactions that yield benefits for companies. The most 
popular transactions include (1) inter-company loans or guarantees from parent to foreign subsidiary, (2) a 
leasing or service agreement between a parent and a foreign subsidiary, and (3) the sale of receivables to a 
special purpose entity. 
15
 See F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press, 
1991. 
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 The rationale behind the disclosure requirements is to alert minority investors to material changes 
in corporate control and ownership structures and to enable them to make an informed assessment of the 
effect of these changes. Still, there is more to be done. The effect of disclosure and reporting requirements 
depends largely on the scope and definitions of ownership and control. Even if the use of bearer shares is 
abolished or restricted, there are a number of other legitimate ways to conceal the true identity of the 
ultimate beneficial owner of a company‟s shares. The picture of ownership and control will thus still be 
blurred if there is no disclosure or reporting requirement for the “ultimate” beneficial owners to reveal their 
identity. For instance, if disclosure must only be made at the level of direct shareholders, the use of 
nominee shareholders, other intermediaries, chains of corporate vehicles or equity derivatives will mask 
the identity of investors (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: The need to disclose the ultimate beneficial owner 
Source: Adapted from D. Zetzsche, Continental vs. Schaeffler, Hidden Ownership and European Law - A Matter of Law or 
Enforcement?, Heinrich-Heine-University Duesseldorf, Faculty of Law, Center for Business and Corporate Law Research Paper 
Series (CBC-RPS) 
 
1.2.1 Nominee and omnibus accounts 
 In practice, a nominee shareholder is typically a company created for the purpose of holding 
shares and other securities on behalf of investors. They hold the shares on trust for one or more beneficial 
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owners, and often only they are identified on the register of shareholders. Usually, foreign investors have 
to open single-client nominee accounts because their global account provider is not permitted to participate 
directly in a local Central Securities Depository (CSD). The concern for regulators is clear: the 
appointment of nominee shareholders would, in effect, provide beneficial owners with the opportunity to 
shield their identity from investors and other stakeholders, making it more difficult to detect expropriation 
by controlling beneficial owners.  
 Likewise, policy makers and regulators increasingly express concerns about omnibus accounts. 
An omnibus account is a securities account that involves many investors. Although the account is opened 
in the name of the account provider, it should be viewed as an umbrella covering a large number of 
individual accounts. Omnibus accounts seriously reduce transaction costs that are due to clearing and 
settlement fees and procedures. However, because the breakdown behind the omnibus accounts is often 
hidden for the listed companies and their investors, they could also be viewed as just another attractive 
instrument to conceal the identity of beneficial owners. 
1.2.2 Derivatives 
 Recently, cash-settled equity derivatives and related techniques are used to obtain effective 
control of the underlying shares without the need for disclosure under the transparency and disclosure 
regimes. To see this, consider the following transaction. An investor (also called holder of the long 
position) purchases and acquires from a derivatives dealer or bank (the holder of the short position) a long 
cash-settled swap covering the underlying shares in a listed company. Under the agreement between the 
holder of the long position and the holder of the short position, the investor benefits from price increases in 
the underlying shares and incurs losses if the price decreases. The derivatives dealer usually assumes a 
neutral risk position by physically acquiring the underlying shares at the strike price of the derivative. The 
swap arrangement thus results in a decoupling of the voting rights from the beneficial ownership of the 
shares. The decoupling leads to “hidden ownership” and could also result in “empty voting” issues.
16
 
Hidden ownership refers to the situation where a cash-settled equity derivative gives the investor a long 
position in the shares of a listed company that remains undisclosed until the investor physically acquires 
the shares or the settlement arrangement is formally changed from a cash settlement to a physical 
settlement. Empty voting occurs when the derivatives broker votes the shares as directed by the investor. 
1.2.3 Control-enhancing mechanisms 
 Investors often employ complex control and ownership arrangements designed to give them 
voting/control rights in excess of their cash-flow rights. These arrangements are commonly employed by 
inside blockholders who usually have voting control, even if they ostensibly have no majority stake in the 
company. Voting rights, for instance, can be separated from cash-flow rights by setting up pyramid or 
cross-shareholding structures, issuing multiple voting rights shares, and participating in shareholder 
coalitions. Ownership pyramids or cascades are the most widely used mechanism to accumulate control 
power with a relatively limited investment in most countries in the world. For instance, Table 1 shows that 
pyramid structures prevail in Europe. They enable a shareholder to maintain control through multiple 
layers of ownership while, at the same time, sharing the investment with other (minority) shareholders at 
each intermediate ownership tier. Pyramid structures reduce the liquidity constraints of large shareholders 
while it allows those shareholders to retain substantial voting power. 
Table 1: Control-enhancing Mechanisms in Europe 
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 See H.T.C. Hu and B. Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and 
Reforms, 61 Business Lawyer 1011, 2006; E.S. De Nardis and M. Tonello, Know Your Shareholder: The 
Use of Cash-Settled Equity Derivatives to Hide Corporate Ownership Interests Conference Board Director 
Notes No. DN-009, July 2010. 
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Control-enhancing Mechanisms Availability Actual Use 
Pyramid structure 100% 75% 
Shareholders agreement 100% 69% 
Cross-shareholdings 100% 31% 
Supermajority provisions 87% N/A 
Multiple voting rights shares 50% 44% 
Source: Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union, External Study Commissioned by the European Commission. 
 In a similar vein, the issuance of multiple voting rights shares provides shareholders with control 
in excess of their share ownership. The separation of beneficial ownership from control rights (or voting 
rights) results in significant private benefits beyond the usual financial return on the shares. The negative 
effect of concentrated ownership is reflected in the size of the control premium. This is the difference 
between the market value of shares, and how much someone is willing to pay for those shares if they 
confer (or maintain) control over a company.  
 The existence of a control premium reflects the gains that majority shareholders can make at the 
expense of minority shareholders. The size of the control premium depends on a number of factors, 
including the competition in the market for corporate control, the size of the block sold, the distribution of 
shares in the target firm, the inequality of voting power, the nationality of the buyer, and the financial 
condition of the firm involved. The existence of large private benefits of control suggests that blockholders 
may be able to obtain a large share of the rents. For instance, the holder of multiple voting rights shares is 
usually allowed a seat on the board of directors and will thus receive non-public information on the 
company‟s cost structure and performance.  
 Control-enhancing mechanisms are prone to severe agency problems. Recent empirical research 
shows that the use of pyramid structures has a negative impact on firm value.
17
 This could be explained by 
decreasing incentives of controlling investors to monitor management in the event they “only” have a 
minority of the economic interest in a company. The research supports calls for improvements in the 
corporate governance infrastructure of most countries. What type of legal rules and other regulatory 
strategies will best serve the infrastructure‟s goal of limiting the effects of self-interested transactions 
involving controlling shareholders? In response to the weaknesses of a corporate governance infrastructure, 
policy makers could address the agency problems by either banning control-enhancing mechanisms or by 
providing increased transparency and disclosure. The first option, however, may have some detrimental 
effects on the innovative and entrepreneurial potential of fast-growing listed companies (see Box 1), 
making disclosure and reporting requirements for control-enhancing mechanisms the preferred option. 
Box 1. The Google case 
Google, Inc., a Delaware corporation, decided to extend the “Google way” of doing business to its corporate 
governance structure. At some point in time, the Google founders and its Chief Executive Officer owned approximately 
90% of the outstanding class B shares, giving them 68% of the firm’s total voting rights while their economic interest 
was only approximately 20% (making them inside blockholders). The multiple voting rights shares did not seem to 
withhold investors to buy class A Google shares. In fact, these investors could actually consider Google’s multiple 
voting rights share structure as good practice during the growth and development stage of the listed company, 
because it gives controlling shareholders (the founders) an incentive to monitor the firm closely and exposes the 
                                                     
17
 See P. Limpaphayom, The Effect of Ownership Structure on the Relation between Corporate Governance and Firm 
Value in Thailand, presented at the OECD-Indonesia Policy Dialogue: Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership 
and Control, Bali, 5 October 2011. 
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founders personally to the firm’s public shareholders and other stakeholders. The fact that Google ranked high on the 
Financial Times Global 500 largest companies in 2010 seems to indicate that the control-enhancing mechanisms do 
not necessarily have a detrimental effect on firm value. 
1.2.4 Chains of corporate vehicles 
 Chains of corporate vehicles could also be used by controlling beneficial owners to conceal their 
true identity and set up complex ownership structures and arrangements in listed companies. Box 2 gives a 
recent example. Companies may have legitimate or clear economic motives to use chains of corporate 
vehicles. However, the use of a chain of local and offshore corporate vehicles or international holding 
structures is sometimes an indication that controlling beneficial owners engage in abusive and 
opportunistic behaviour. Whilst misuse of corporate entities is often difficult to discover, it is 
acknowledged that (potential) misuse of corporate vehicles can be limited by the maintenance and sharing 
of information on beneficial ownership and control in the corporate vehicle through a number of legal and 
regulatory measures. These measures include: (1) an up-front beneficial ownership disclosure to the public 
authorities and official intermediaries, (2) mandating private corporate service providers to maintain 
beneficial ownership information, and (3) primary reliance on an investigative system. In the second part 
of this paper, we discuss the mechanisms to hide the identity of the beneficial owners of corporate vehicles 
in more detail. More importantly, we critically assess the ability of anti-money laundering and anti-
terrorism rules to provide transparency in the area of ownership and control in listed companies, thereby 
protecting minority investors in general. 
Box 2. Variable Interest Entities in China 
The “variable interest entity” (VIE) structure is a chain of corporate vehicles and contractual arrangements, 
designed to comply with China’s restrictive foreign direct investments (FDI) measures that protect many domestic 
industries and service sectors. As a first step, an offshore legal entity will be established. The offshore entity owns and 
controls one onshore wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) or foreign-invested enterprise (FIE). The onshore 
company gains control over a domestic company that operates in one of the restricted sectors by entering into several 
service agreements. These agreements allow foreign investors to hold controlling stakes in Chinese companies. This 
VIE structure, which is common in internet and e-commerce sectors, makes it possible for Chinese companies to 
access foreign capital markets through offshore listings. Sina.com was the first internet company that pursued a listing 
on NASDAQ through a VIE structure. According to statistics of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and the Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx), 34 Chinese VIEs gained access to stock exchanges in the United States in 
2010. In the same year, 4 VIEs were “listed” on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Despite being used for the IPOs of 
many Chinese businesses, the VIE structure poses risks to investors arising out of its complex structure. Consider the 
Alibaba-Yahoo dispute. Yahoo owns 43% of Alibaba, a Chinese internet group, through a VIE structure. Despite its 
“controlling” stake, Yahoo could not prevent that Alibaba spun off its online payments division, Alipay, as a domestic 
company controlled by Alibaba’s chairman, Jack Ma. The restructuring was justified as necessary in order for Alipay to 
obtain the necessary payment business permit from the People’s Bank of China. Allegedly, the bank would have 
refused to issue the permit to Alibaba, if it had foreign ownership through a VIE structure. 
 
1.3 Beneficial ownership and control: the challenges 
 The difficulties involved in tracing ultimate beneficial ownership and, more importantly control, 
make it onerous for minority investors and other stakeholders to discover and curtail self-dealing, such as 
asset stripping, related party transactions and share dilutions by the ultimate controlling beneficial owners. 
Not surprisingly, the recent financial crisis calls for stricter disclosure and reporting rules that help uncover 
the complicated control structures used by ultimate beneficial owners of listed companies.  
 On March 7, 2011, for instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the United 
States received a petition for rulemaking submitted by a law firm recommending amendments to the 
regulatory provisions that govern disclosures required by persons who “beneficially own” more than 5% of 
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a class of equity securities of a publicly listed company.
18
 The petition specifically requested that the time 
period within which beneficial ownership reports must be filed with the SEC be shortened pursuant to the 
SEC‟s statutory authority provided in Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The petition 
also asked the SEC to broaden the definition of beneficial ownership to include ownership interests held by 
persons who use derivative instruments. The proposed amendment would ensure that investors have 
information about all persons who have the potential to change or influence control of the issuer.  
 There is something to the call for stricter disclosure and reporting rules and regulations. Investors 
fare better in a corporate governance environment that allows beneficial owners to acquire control either 
directly or indirectly through derivatives or chains of corporate vehicles (if this meets a company‟s specific 
governance needs and requirements) than in a system that prohibits beneficial market activity.
19
 In order to 
protect minority investors, policy makers and legislatures should therefore consider the introduction of 
clear and stringent disclosure and transparency obligations that offer minority investors a true picture of 
ownership and control structures and, more importantly, reveal the identity of the persons who should be 
considered as the ultimate beneficial owner.  
 Indeed, a good corporate governance infrastructure should ideally combine large investor 
involvement with legal protection of minority investors. Obviously, minority investor protection will be 
challenging without access to reliable information about the ownership, including the identity of the 
controlling owners, and control structures of listed companies. However, despite clear benefits, a 
disclosure and reporting regime has its costs as well.  
 A recent analysis by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. cast doubt on whether the rules 
in the United States should be tightened.
20
 Firstly, they argue that empirical research has shown that 
controlling beneficial owners provide benefits to other shareholders “by making incumbent directors and 
managers more accountable, thereby reducing agency costs and managerial slack.”  
 Secondly, they show that tighter rules could seriously decrease blockholders‟ incentives to 
engage in monitoring. For instance, outside blockholders‟ monitoring and disciplining activities can be 
explained by a listed company‟s stock price not reflecting the company‟s potential. A (too) strict and 
disproportional disclosure and reporting regime that obliges a blockholder to disclose its position at a very 
early stage without being able to benefit more from relatively low stock prices, would arguably discourage 
them to engage in monitoring, thereby increasing “vertical agency costs”. Indeed, public information about 
the presence of outside blockholders will have a price increasing effect on a listed company‟s stock price 
and, as a consequence, reduce the incidence and size of outside blocks.  
 Thirdly, they point at the lack of empirical evidence that the current trading technologies and 
practices, such as cash settled derivatives, have led to increased accumulations of ownership.  
 Fourthly, they argue that strict disclosure regimes tilt the playing field against blockholders 
monitoring activities. A disclosure and reporting regime could target several types of beneficial owners: (1) 
passive beneficial owners who are only interested in a company‟s share price, (2) beneficial owners who 
monitor the performance of listed companies and initiate dialogues with management, and (3) beneficial 
owners that seek to acquire control over a listed company. Clearly, the market is particularly interested in 
the third category of beneficial owners. Targeting the whole range of beneficial owners could further 
discourage legitimate blockholders‟ activities.  
                                                     
18
 See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission - Petition for Rulemaking 
Under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 7 March 2011. 
19
 See also M. Kettunen and W-G Ringe, Disclosure Regulation of Cash-Settled Equity derivatives - An Intentions-
Based Approach, University of Oxford, Legal Research Paper Series, July 2011 (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1844886). 
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 See L.A. Bebchuk and R.J. Jackson Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, The Harvard John M. 
Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 702, July 2011. 
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 Finally, they point out that tightening the disclosure regime cannot be justified on the grounds 
that it is needed to protect minority investors. A stringent disclosure and reporting regime could lead to 
information overload. Stricter disclosure and reporting requirements that increase the complexity and 
quantity of information in the financial market, make it more difficult for minority investors to make 
informed and considered choices regarding their investments. This is especially true if rules and 
regulations endeavour to target ownership through complex derivatives arrangements even if the “owner” 
does not seek control.
21
 
Subsequent to the petition for more stringent rulemaking, another law firm acting on behalf of 
institutional investors submitted a paper to the SEC which, in line with the views of Bebchuk and Jackson, 
opposed to the change on the ground that shortening the time period would be bad for all investors.
22
 The 
SEC has not proposed any rule changes so far, and it is currently not clear if and whether the SEC will do 
so. As we will see, the SEC also declined to adopt any changes to the relevant rules so as to require cash-
settled equity derivatives to be treated as conferring beneficial ownership in the summer of 2011. 
 It follows from the above discussion that the design of a balanced and effective disclosure and 
reporting regime into a country‟s corporate governance framework poses something of a challenge. Who - 
and at which shareholders level - should report a stake in a listed company? When should the disclosure be 
made and to whom? What should be disclosed? Through which channels should beneficial ownership and 
control be reported? Who will have access to the reported information?  
 Arguably, countries need a proportionate and flexible reporting and disclosure regime to combine 
the best of two “worlds”: protection against self-dealing activities without creating disincentives for 
(outside) blockholders to intervene in badly managed companies (see Table 2). Furthermore, in order to 
have practical relevance, the disclosure and reporting requirements should be complemented with 
investigation and enforcement mechanisms. Without these mechanisms, the disclosed and reported 
information is most likely inaccurate.  
 For instance, in Germany, the shareholders of a private company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter 
Haftung) must be registered in a public shareholders register. Until recently, there were no incentives for 
the companies and its shareholders to update the registers. The practical relevance of these registers was 
therefore limited due to the lack of investigation and enforcement mechanisms. It should be noted, 
however, that the presence of de jure enforcement mechanisms does not guarantee compliance with a 
disclosure and reporting system. Empirical research in the area of disclosure and filing of annual accounts 
in non-listed companies in Europe indicates that even if there is a de jure enforcement of the obligation to 
file an annual account, the de facto lack of enforcement actually discourages companies to abide by even 
the most stringent rules.
23
  
Table 2: Beneficial Ownership and Control: The Challenges for Policy Makers and Regulators  
Outside blockholders Inside blockholders 
The good: Outside blockholders have an incentive to 
improve management by making incumbent directors and 
managers more accountable and thereby reducing 
agency costs and managerial slack. 
The Good: Inside blockholders tend to overcome 
underinvestment problems. Moreover, fast-growing and 
innovative listed companies tend to benefit from the 
presence of inside blockholders. 
The Bad: Outside blockholders could decide to pursue 
short-term opportunistic activities. 
The Bad: Inside blockholders have a strong incentive to 
reap private benefits of control through self-dealing and 
insider trading. 
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 See M.K. Brunnermeier and M. Oehmke, Complexity in Financial Market, Working Paper, 2009. 
22
 See Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission – 
Consideration of Section 13(d) Rules, File No. 4-624, 5 August 2011. 
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Outside blockholders Inside blockholders 
The disclosure regime should not be too stringent. 
Outside blockholders invest in monitoring in their belief 
that the actual (low) share price does not reflect the true 
value of the company. Empirical research shows that their 
monitoring activities protect minority investors against 
managerial slack. The share price will increase 
dramatically when the presence of outside blockholders is 
disclosed. This has a negative effect on the incentives of 
the blockholders to buy additional shares to increase their 
stake, preventing them from becoming a stronger 
blockholder and reducing their expected returns. 
The disclosure regime should be stringent and 
demanding. Inside blockholders have an incentive to 
protect their private benefits of control at the expense of 
minority investors. 
Source: Adapted from L.A. Bebchuk and R.J. Jackson Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, The Harvard John M. 
Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 702, July 2011; X. Chen and J. Yur-Austin, Re-measuring agency costs: The 
effectiveness of blockholders, 47 The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 588, 2007; A. Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory 
Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business 
Discussion Paper Series. Paper 492, 2004. 
In this light, this paper provides a balance sheet for disclosure and reporting regimes in countries 
around the world. The first item of the balance sheet, to which we now turn, is the reporting requirement 





2. DISCLOSURE OF CONTROL STRUCTURES AND THE IDENTITY OF BENEFICIAL 
OWNERS 
 As noted in the previous Section, disclosure and reporting rules and regulations are important 
elements of the corporate governance infrastructure in a country. Adequate disclosure and reporting 
requirements are widely recognized as crucial to mitigate the adverse effects of self-dealing and 
opportunistic behaviour by controlling shareholders and ensure the accurate pricing of securities. 
Moreover, information about a company‟s controlling shareholding structure and voting rights is crucial 
for regulating the conflicts between controlling and minority investors.  
 For instance, the European Union, characterized by control and insider coalitions, has long 
recognized the importance of mandatory disclosure of significant shareholdings. In 1988, the EU adopted a 
Directive on the Information to be published when a Major Holding in a Listed Company is Acquired or 
Disposed of.
24
 This Directive was later repealed by the Transparency Directive,
25
 which provides an 
improved framework for periodic and ad hoc disclosure. One of the aims of the Transparency Directive is 
to harmonize the disclosure regime regarding significant shareholdings so as to enhance investor protection 
across the European Union. The Directive intends to complement the corporate governance infrastructure 
of the Member States by introducing rules that are designed to set the minimum standard for supplying 
investors with timely information about acquisitions or disposals of voting rights of listed companies 
exceeding or falling below certain thresholds.  
 Firstly, Article 9 provides that investors will be required to disclose the acquisition or disposal of 
shareholdings in listed companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, based on 
thresholds starting at 5% continuing at intervals of 5% until 30% of the voting rights.
26
 This rule aligns the 
disclosure practices amongst the Member States while allowing certain local governments to broaden the 
scope of the transparency rules and/or require disclosure at an earlier stage or at closer intervals. The 
French legislature, for instance, extended the disclosure requirement to economic actors who entered into 
agreements or acquired other financial instruments that give them the right to acquire a substantial number 
of shares at their sole discretion in the near or intermediate future.  
 Secondly, the Directive, through Article 12(2), requires a notification of a change in a major 
shareholding to four trading days (starting one day after the shareholding exceeds or falls below one of the 
thresholds mentioned in Article 9). Subsequently the listed company should inform the public of the 
change in major shareholding within three trading days after receipt of the notification. In France, Article 
223-17 of the AMF General Regulation adds that the notification should also include an investor‟s 
intentions if the thresholds of 10%, 15%, 20% or 25% are exceeded.  
 Thirdly, the notification requirement applies to various classes of shares, such as warrants and 
convertible bonds if the holdings reach or fall below certain thresholds (Article 16). The rationale behind 
the inclusion of certain types of derivatives is based on the view that influence over a company may also be 
directed through such financial contracts. Finally, the Directive does not apply to (1) shares acquired for 
the sole purpose of clearing and settling within the usual short settlement cycle, or (2) shares held by 
custodians in their custodian capacity provided that they can only exercise the voting rights attached to 
such shares under instructions given in writing or electronically. 
 A recent study on the application of the Transparency Directive indicates that the Directive is 
widely considered to add to the quality of the corporate governance infrastructure of the European Member 
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 That is to say that the Directive appears to achieve its objectives of providing accurate, 
comprehensive and timely information to the market. However, the recent market turmoil and illiquidity 
have raised questions about the scope of the transparency and disclosure requirements under the Directive.  
 A recent Commission report on the operation of the Transparency Directive,
28
 for instance, stated 
that the Transparency Directive should be adapted to innovative and complex investment instruments in 
financial markets. Improved disclosure of stock lending practices as well as cash-settled equity derivatives 
should avoid problems of “empty voting” and “hidden ownership”.
29
 An example of an “improved” 
disclosure regime can be found in France. Article 223-11 of the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) 
General Regulation provides that the holders of financial instruments related to shares to be issued or with 
similar economic effect to holding shares (i.e., cash-settled equity swaps) must also be disclosed when one 
of the thresholds is reached.
30
 On 25 October 2011 the European Commission presented a proposal to 
amend the Transparency Directive. The proposal seeks to address the “hidden ownership” and “empty 
voting” issues by extending the disclosure requirements to cash-settled equity derivatives.
31
 The European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has been entrusted with ensuring a consistent and proportionate 
application of the Directive by drafting regulatory technical standards. 
 And there is more to be done, according to corporate governance experts.
32
 In the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, there has been a dramatic increase in attention to promoting shareholder engagement in 
corporate governance matters.
33
 By rethinking the engagement with their portfolio companies, institutional 
investors could usher in a new ownership and control culture that would benefit minority investors and 
other stakeholders alike. It is suggested that new corporate governance measures should be introduced to 
spur institutional investors‟ involvement in monitoring and assessing the long-term strategy of listed 
companies. This is necessary in market systems, which are characterized by high frequency trading and 
rapid and continuous changes in share ownership.  
 Regulators seem to take the stand that the growing importance of stock prices when assessing the 
performance of companies seems to encourage only short-term thinking. Long-term shareholders 
engagement is important to counterbalance this trend. In this respect, institutional investors could provide 
markets and other shareholders with substantial benefits. Since these investors tend to conduct extensive 
research before taking significant trading positions, they could contribute to market efficiency. It appears, 




 For instance, the use of nominee and omnibus accounts has a blurring effect on the true picture of 
ownership and control, making it difficult for management of a listed company to initiate a sustainable 
dialogue with investors. Clearly, in Europe the current Transparency Directive with its disclosure 
thresholds is insufficient for identifying institutional beneficial owners. 
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 The national corporate governance infrastructures of many Member States contain rules and 
requirements that enable listed companies to request for shareholders identification in light of the 
participation and voting in general shareholders meetings.
35
 However, there is no EU-wide mechanism 
allowing listed companies to obtain information about the identity of all the beneficial investors. Therefore, 
to improve the corporate governance infrastructure, proposals have been made to revise the Transparency 
Directive. The main idea behind the revision is to include an EU-wide shareholder identification 
mechanism to allow listed companies to receive information about first, second and subsequent layer 
shareholdings, irrespective of shares being held as bearer shares or through nominee and omnibus 
accounts. Figure 3 provides a high-level overview of how shares can be held and, more importantly, how 
information can be obtained. Explanations of some of the most commonly used terms in describing 
shareholding and ownership structures are provided in Box 3. 
 In the next section, we compare the European transparency and disclosure regime with the rules 
and regulations in the United States and Asia and highlight the differences. We start with the 
implementation of the EU directive in Italy, contrasting it with the experiences in Asia, in which a high 
proportion of listed companies have significant concentrations of voting blocks, and the United States, 
which is characterized by a market system with widely dispersed shareholders. 
Box 3. Explanation of terms used to describe shareholding structures 
First layer “shareholders”: The information available at the level of the account holder at Central Securities 
Depository (CSD). The account holder may be, but is usually not, the ultimate beneficial owner of the shares. If an 
intermediary with an account at the CSD holds its securities in separate sub-accounts according to each client, then 
these sub-account holders are also defined as the “first layer”. In some jurisdictions these account holders are 
considered as the shareholders who are entitled to vote. This is, for instance, the case in Austria, Estonia, Spain, 
Ireland, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. 
Second and subsequent layer “shareholders”: Intermediaries holding shares as nominees or acting as 
omnibus account holders. 
Final layer “shareholders”: The end-investor or beneficial owner. In the majority of European Member States, 
the final layer is recognized as the shareholder. This is the case in Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Finland, 
France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Sweden. 
Source: Adapted from (1) European Central Bank and Target 2 Securities, T2S Taskforce on Shareholder Transparency - Final 
Report to the T2S Advisory Group, 28 February 2011, (2) European Central Bank and Target 2 Securities, Market Analysis of 
Shareholder Transparency Regimes in Europe, 9 December 2010, and (3) Rejaul Karim Byron and Gazi Towhid Ahmed, Omnibus 
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Figure 3: Multiple layers of shareholdings 
Source: Adapted from European Central Bank and Target 2 Securities, T2S Taskforce on Shareholder Transparency - Final Report to 
the T2S Advisory Group, Version: 28 February 2011; European Central Bank and Target 2 Securities, Market Analysis of Shareholder 
Transparency Regimes in Europe, 9 December 2010 
2.1 Comparative overview 
2.1.1 Italy 
 The Italian Consolidated Law on Finance and CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per le Società 
e la Borsa, the Italian securities regulator/supervisory authority) Issuers‟ regulation contains provisions that 
require the disclosure of physical shareholdings if certain thresholds are met. The first threshold, which 
deviates from the Transparency Directive, is set at 2%. The subsequent thresholds are 5%, 10%, 15%, 
20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%, 66,6%, 75%, 90% and 95%. Long and short positions acquired 
through derivative instruments also have to be disclosed when the following thresholds are met: 2%, 5%, 
10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 75%.  
 Despite Italy‟s 2% threshold, it is fair to say that the regulatory 5% threshold to disclose 
beneficial ownership is the international norm. Countries that implemented a stricter threshold, like Italy 
and, as we will see, Malaysia, have taken or are taking measures to amend the rules. In Italy, for instance, 
there is evidence that institutional investors keep their participations just below the 2% threshold. They are 
reluctant to disclose their positions, which will undoubtedly lead to an increase in compliance costs. It 
should therefore come as no surprise that CONSOB, the Italian securities regulator, decided to raise the 
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threshold for certain investors, such as mutual funds in 2009. Still, this measure is probably not enough. 
The pressure to relax the rules for all investors is slowly but surely increasing in Italy. 
 The challenge of devising an effective disclosure regime is apparent in Italy. On the one hand, we 
see a trend to introduce more flexible and proportionate disclosure rules and requirements. On the other 
hand, however, CONSOB looks for ways to introduce a more stringent disclosure regime. For instance, in 
May 2011, CONSOB issued a consultation document on extending the disclosure obligations to positions 
held through cash-settled equity derivatives. Notification of major shareholdings must be made by the 
ultimate controlling person for the total number of shares held (through subsidiaries, controlled 
undertaking, trusts, and nominees). The information that should be made available is indicated on a 
standard form. This form must be filed by the shareholder to CONSOB and the respective listed company 
within five trading days from the moment that the ownership threshold has been reached. CONSOB will 
then, after having verified the accuracy of the information, disclose the shareholding to the market through 
its website within three trading days. 
 CONSOB‟s website (www.consob.it) is publicly accessible and contains a wealth of up-to-date 
information about a company‟s ownership and control structure. It provides both Italian and foreign 
investors and other interested parties with detailed ownership and control information about significant 
shareholders (persons holding, directly or indirectly, together or alone, more than 2% of the share capital). 
The website has very user-friendly features, such as the possibility to visualize the control and ownership 
structures of listed companies in a pie chart. Information about “significant” changes in the shareholding 
structure is separately accessible. The same is true for changes in “potential” holdings through derivative 
arrangements. 
2.1.2 The United States 
 In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) principally 
governs the disclosure and reporting of ownership and control structures in listed companies. Sections 
13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act require a person who is the beneficial owner of more than 5% of 
certain equity securities to disclose information relating to such beneficial ownership within 10 calendar 
days after the Section 13(d) threshold is crossed. These statutory sections do not provide a definition of the 
term “beneficial owner”. However, the Commission has adopted flexible rules that determine the 
circumstances under which a person is or may be viewed as such. Consider here Exchange Act Rule 13d-3, 
which provides objective standards for determining when a person is or may be deemed to be a beneficial 
owner subject to Section 13(d). Application of Rule 13d-3 allows for case-by-case determinations as to 
whether a person is or becomes a beneficial owner itself.
36
 
 The SEC does not make case-by-case determinations about beneficial ownership by particular 
investors.  Instead, investors and their advisors must apply the SEC‟s rules to determine when and how to 
report beneficial ownership; the general principles set forth in the rules allow some flexibility for a 
standard “market practice” application of the rules to develop over time in response to particular sets of 
facts. Occasionally, the staff of the SEC may, if requested by an investor, provide unofficial guidance to 
the investor regarding a particular set of facts in the form of what is a called a “no-action” letter (the 
terminology refers to the confirmation in the letter that the staff will not recommend enforcement action by 
the SEC against a party on the basis of a particular set of facts). The SEC staff more frequently publishes 
general guidance to investors in the form of “compliance and disclosure interpretations” that set forth the 
staff‟s view as to how rules should be interpreted or applied to particular situations. The staff of the SEC 
also reviews market developments from time to time to determine if changes to the rules or the published 
interpretations are necessary. 
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 Generally, beneficial owners are defined under Rule 13d-3(a) as persons who may, directly or 
indirectly, vote or dispose or direct the voting or disposition of a voting class of equity securities registered 
under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. The beneficial ownership reporting requirements provide investors 
and the respective listed company with information about accumulations of voting classes of equity 
securities that may have the potential to change or influence control over the listed company. The statutory 
and regulatory framework establishes a reporting system for collecting and disseminating information 
about the ownership of publicly held equity securities. As mentioned, this framework is established under 
Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act. 
 Under Section 13(d) and Schedule 13D, a beneficial owner who is required to report must 
disclose the background and identity, residence, and citizenship of, and the nature of the beneficial 
ownership by, such person and all other persons by whom or on whose behalf the purchases have been or 
are to be effected. The disclosure must also cover the number of shares beneficially owned, the source of 
funds used to purchase the shares, and if the purpose of the purchase is to acquire control of the listed 
company, then any plans of the reporting person to liquidate the company, to sell its assets, to engage it in 
a merger, or other specified transactions.  
 Section 13(d)(2) of the Exchange Act and corresponding Rule 13d-2(a) require that material 
changes to the information disclosed in Schedule 13D be disclosed in an amended filing. The acquisition or 
disposition of beneficial ownership of a securities in an amount equal to 1% or more of a class of securities 
is deemed material under Rule 13d-2(a), although acquisitions or dispositions of less than those amounts 
may be material, depending on the facts and circumstances. Other material changes in the facts disclosed 
must likewise be disclosed. An amendment to a Schedule 13D must be filed promptly at EDGAR, the 
SEC‟s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system. EDGAR performs automated collection, 
validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by companies and others who are required 
by law to file forms with the SEC. EDGAR aims to increase the efficiency and fairness of the financial 
market by accelerating the receipt, acceptance, dissemination, and analysis of time-sensitive beneficial 
ownership and control information filed with the SEC. In addition, the SEC‟s website contains information 
on SEC enforcement proceedings including descriptions of, among other things: civil suits filed in federal 
court, administrative proceedings filed before the SEC, and trading suspensions.  
 The financial crisis has raised questions, similar to what we have seen in Europe, as to whether 
the disclosure regime under Section 13(d) should be tightened.
37
 For example, Section 766 of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 amended the Exchange Act by adding 
Section 13(o), which provides that “a person shall be deemed to acquire beneficial ownership of an equity 
security based on the purchase or sale of a security-based swap” if the Commission adopts rules after 
making certain determinations with respect to cash-settled equity derivatives and consulting with the 
prudential regulators and the Secretary of the Treasury. However, on June 8, 2011, the SEC readopted, in 
accordance with Section 13(o), the relevant portions of the existing Exchange Act Rules 13d-3 and 16a-1 
without change, effectively declining to alter the treatment of cash-settled equity derivatives for purposes 
of determining “beneficial ownership” of equity securities under Sections 13 and 16 of the Exchange Act.  
2.1.3 China 
 Rules and regulations regarding the disclosure and reporting of beneficial ownership and control 
structures can be found in the Companies Law of the People's Republic of China, the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Securities (China Securities Law), the Administrative Measures for the Disclosure of 
Information of Listed Companies, and, dependent on where the company is listed, the Rules Governing the 
Listing of Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. 
 China‟s Securities Law and regulations state that any listed company must disclose the 
information about the beneficial ownership and voting rights of its major shareholders in the annual reports 
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and semi-annual reports. This information includes: (1) the total number of shareholders by the end of the 
reporting period, (2) the names of shareholders holding 5% or more of the company‟s outstanding shares, 
as well as changes in shareholdings. It should be noted that the regulations also provide that anyone who is 
not a physical shareholder but is able to hold actual control over the acts of a company by means of 
investment relations, agreements or any other method should be considered to be “in control” and, hence, 
should comply with the disclosure rules.  
 In addition, Article 3 of the Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure by Listed 
Companies stipulates that the directors of listed companies shall ensure the accuracy and completeness of 
the information disclosed. Article 24 states, moreover, that the directors of a company shall sign and 
endorse regular reports. If directors are unable to verify the information, they should include the 
conclusions of their findings in the report. 
 Finally, it is stipulated in Article 90 of the Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies 
that the secretary of the board of directors may at the company‟s discretion supplement the legal rules and 
regulations regarding the information that has to be disclosed. For instance, the company can issue internal 
rules regarding consultation procedures so as to ascertain that the disclosed information is correct. 
According to Articles 87-89, the company is responsible for ensuring a proper disclosure. The beneficial 
ownership and control information should be reported to the respective stock exchange as well as the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
2.1.4 Indonesia 
 Investors in Indonesia have to abide by several legislative and regulatory provisions designed to 
ensure the disclosure and reporting of direct shareholdings. Rule No. X.K.6 and Rule No. X.M.1 issued by 
Bapepam-LK are examples of such provisions. According to Bapepam-LK Rule No. X.K.6 regarding the 
obligation to submit an annual report, listed companies are required to annually disclose and report 
information regarding significant direct shareholders who own 5% or more of the company‟s shares.  
 This information becomes also available on the website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(www.idx.co.id). Bapepam-LK Rule no. X.M.1 requires all significant direct shareholders who own 5% or 
more of the outstanding shares to send a report containing information about the shareholding to the 
Indonesian Capital Market Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK) within ten days from the transaction date. 
A copy of the report must be made available to the Indonesia Stock Exchange and to the Clearing 
Guarantee Institution. The report must at least include the following information: (1) the name, address, 
and nationality of the shareholder, (2) the number of shares purchased or sold, (3) the purchase and the 
selling price, (4) the date of the transaction, and (5) the purpose of the transaction. 
 As for the first layer of “shareholdings”, Bapepam-LK Rule no. X.C.1 obliges the Central 
Securities Depository (PT Kustodian Sentral Efek Indonesia – KSEI) to inform Bapepam-LK as soon as a 
registered “shareholder” acquires 5% or more of the shares. The information includes, among other things, 
(1) the name of the stock account holder, (2) the name of the client (the holder of stock sub account), (3) 
the address (if any) and citizenship (or statutory address for corporate vehicles), (4) the name of listed 
company; and (5) the date of the transaction. 
2.1.5 Malaysia 
 The primary requirements regarding the disclosure and reporting of beneficial ownership and 
control can be found in (1) the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 (Malaysian Companies Act), (2) the 
Capital Markets & Services Act 2007 (CMSA), the Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991 
(SICDA), the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad (Listing Requirements), and the 
Rules of Bursa Malaysia Depository Sdn Bhd (Depository Rules). We spell out the details of how these 
requirements work below. 
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2.1.5.1 Company law 
 Section 158 of the Malaysian Companies Act (last amended in 2006) provides that companies 
must maintain a register of its members. The register is not publicly available, but open for inspection by 
any member free of charge (Section 160(2)). The register contains the following information (Section 
158(1)): names, addresses, identity card numbers, nationality, any other relevant information about the 
members, the number of shares held by each member and the amount paid or agreed to be considered as 
paid on the shares of each member; the date at which the person became a member or ceased to be a 
member; and the date of every allotment of shares to members and the number of shares comprised in each 
allotment. A member may request the company to provide him with a copy of the register, but only so far 
as it relates to names, addresses, number of shares held and amounts paid up, upon payment of RM1.00 for 
every 100 words (Section 158(3)). 
 In addition to the shareholders register, a separate register of the substantial shareholders must be 
maintained (Section 69L), containing the following information: (1) names, nationality, addresses and full 
particulars of the voting shares in the company in which the substantial shareholder has an interest or 
interests, full particulars of such interest and the reasons for the shareholder‟s participation (Section 
69E(1)); or (2) where there is a change in the interest or interests, full particulars of the change including 
the date of the change and the circumstances by reason of which the change occurred (Section 69F(1)); or 
(3) where a person ceases to be a substantial shareholder, his name, and the date on which he ceased to be a 
substantial shareholder and an detailed explanation for the reasons of the shareholder ceasing to be a 
substantial shareholder (Section 69G(1)). 
 The shareholder who owns a substantial stake in a company has a duty to ensure that a notice is 
sent to this company regarding the substantial interest in the company within seven days after becoming a 
substantial shareholder (Section 69E); any change in the substantial interest (Section 69F) including if 
he/she ceases to be a substantial shareholder (Section 69G). A substantial shareholder is a person 
(including natural persons, whether citizens or non-citizens, and corporate vehicles, whether carrying on 
business in Malaysia or not – Section 69C) who owns 5% or more of the voting shares of the company 
(Section 69D). Interest here has been broadly defined to include deemed interest arising from, for example, 
a contract to purchase shares, a right to acquire a share or an interest in a share under an option (Section 
6A). 
 Section 69O also provides that any listed company may require any of its members (1) to inform 
it whether the member holds any voting shares in the company as beneficial owner or trustee; and (2) if the 
member holds as trustee, to indicate so far as possible the identity of the persons for whom he holds the 
shares; and (3) to require any member to inform the company whether any of the voting rights are the 
subject of any agreement or arrangement under which another person is entitled to control the exercise of 
these rights. The listed company may also require any other person who has an interest in the voting shares 
in the company to provide similar information. Furthermore, the Companies Act empowers the Registrar of 
Companies at the Companies Commission to request a company, person or individual to furnish 
information regarding the particulars of any share acquired or held directly or indirectly either for his own 
benefit or for any other company, person or individual and have them verified by a statutory declaration 
(Section 69A). The requested information can be filed electronically. It is also possible to upload 
documents. 
2.1.5.2 Listing requirements 
 Besides the detailed company law rules, there are more disclosure requirements in Malaysia. For 
instance, the Listing Requirements contain the following key rules on disclosure of ownership and control: 
a listed company must immediately announce any received notice relating to substantial shareholding 
(paragraph 9.19(17) and (18)), and any change of control in the listed issuer (paragraph 9.19(41)).  
 Moreover, a listed company must include a statement setting out the following information in its 
annual report (paragraph 23, Appendix 9C): names of significant shareholders (excluding bare trustees) 
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and their direct and deemed interests stating the number and percentage of shares in which they have an 
interest as shown in the register of significant shareholders; direct and deemed interests of each director 
(including number and percentage) in the listed issuer or in a related corporation, appearing in the register 
of directors‟ shareholdings; number of holders of each class of equity securities and any convertible 
securities and the voting rights attached to each class; distribution schedule of each class of equity 
securities and any convertible securities setting out the number of holders and their percentage stake in the 
company; names of the 30 securities account holders having the largest number of securities from each 
class of equity securities and convertible securities according to the Record of Depositors, and the number 
and percentage held. 
  The announcements that listed companies have to make under the Listing Requirements can be 
submitted through the Bursa Malaysia Listing Information Network (“Bursa LINK”). Bursa LINK is an 
electronic platform that automates the receipt, dissemination, storage and retrieval of listed corporations‟ 
announcements, prospectuses, circulars, information memorandum, quarterly reports, annual reports etc. 
Bursa LINK not only provides users an easy access to upload information, it also enables regulators, 
investors and other market participants to instantly obtain information about beneficial ownership and 
control structures. 
2.1.5.3 Depository rules 
 Finally, the Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991 (SICDA) provides that every 
securities account with the central depository (i.e., Bursa Malaysia Depository Sdn Bhd) should be opened 
in the name of the beneficial owner of the deposited securities or in the name of an authorized nominee 
(being a person who is authorized to act as a nominee as specified under the Depository Rules) (Section 
25(4)). The Depository Rules further provide that where the securities account is opened in the name of an 
authorized nominee, the authorized nominee must: (1) stipulate the name of the beneficial owner in a 
special application form (Rule 25.02B(2)); and (2) furnish to the central depository the name of and other 
relevant information about the beneficial owner (Rule 25.02(4)). If an authorized nominee fails to provide 
the information required by the Central Depository pursuant to Rule 25.04, the central depository may 
revoke the authorized nominee‟s authority to act as an authorized nominee, suspend any or all securities 
account held by the authorized nominee for such period as may be specified by the central depository or 
issue any instruction or directive or impose any condition on the authorized nominee as the central 
depository deems fit (Rules 25.02(5) and (6)).  
 Thus, even though custodians and nominee companies are allowed to operate omnibus accounts, 
they are under an obligation to disclose the beneficial owner of the securities upon request of the regulator 
(the Securities Commission of Malaysia). They will be subject to sanctions if they fail to comply with this 
duty.
38
 It must be noted however that any information or document relating to the affairs of any of the 
depositors, and in particular, relating to their securities accounts, are prohibited from being disclosed to 
any person (Sections 43 and 44 of the SICDA). Section 45 provides instances where and the parties to 
whom such information may be disclosed, i.e., if depositor has consented to the disclosure or if the 
disclosure is required in the public interest. 
2.2 Key findings and main messages 
 In light of the foregoing discussion, what is the balance sheet for the disclosure and reporting 
regimes in the respective countries (see Figure 4)? Their benefits are widely acknowledged: they provide 
minority investors and other stakeholders with the necessary information about the beneficial owners of 
listed companies and the control structures that these owners employ. Without this information the 
minority investors and other stakeholders in a listed company are insufficiently protected against market 
manipulation and abusive tactics by controlling owners.  
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 See generally Section 5 of this paper. 
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 In this respect, it is not surprising that Malaysia is viewed as a regional leader in minority 
protection.
39
 Malaysia‟s disclosure system is very extended and detailed. In this respect, it could be viewed 
as a rules-based system that offers a high level of disclosure and reporting requirements and, equally 
important, easy and electronic access to ownership and control information. Minority investors and other 
interested parties can find information going as far as the final layer of beneficial owners provided that the 
beneficial owner is considered to be a substantial shareholder who holds, either directly or indirectly, at 
least 5% of the outstanding shares.  
 Similarly, the United States has clear, accessible and also flexible rules that provide transparency 
in the different layers of shareholdings. EDGAR and its widely reputed web-based access provides detailed 
and up-to-date information about listed companies, making it possible for companies to build a reputation 
as a competent and reliable investment opportunity. Here, it is also worth mentioning that Italy‟s CONSOB 
not only provides a web-based portal that is accessible and easy to use, it also gives a clear presentation of 
the shareholding structure of listed companies. 
 On the cost side,
40
 the discussed disclosure and reporting rules entail ostensibly no great deal of 
harm. But, as we have seen, overly stringent rules could discourage engagement by outside blockholders 
and dialogue between these blockholders and management of an underperforming listed company, thereby 
increasing “vertical agency costs”.  
 Moreover, detailed and mandatory disclosure and reporting regimes that offer hardly any 
flexibility could have counterproductive effects. To see this, consider the following arguments. Strict 
disclosure regimes often have a disproportionate impact on the financial markets in that they lead to 
excessive compliance costs for the listed companies, their investors and the supervisory authorities. 
Moreover, they usually exacerbate the information overload that already exists in the financial markets.
41
  
 These costs formed the main reason for the reform of the beneficial ownership rules and 
regulations in Malaysia in 2005. Before the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Malaysia had very basic rules on 
beneficial ownership. The government reacted to the crisis by introducing detailed, but inflexible rules to 
restore investors‟ confidence in the financial market. However, the costs resulting from the inflexibility of 
the disclosure system negatively affected Malaysian‟s reputation and attractiveness to, particularly, foreign 
investors. This eventually led to the government‟s decision to relax and streamline the regime in 2005.
42
  
 It follows from the comparative overview above that most jurisdictions currently have well-
balanced regimes. For instance, flexibility and proportionality prevail in the US system. The system allows 
for a determination of a beneficial owner, depending on all relevant facts and circumstances. In the current 
era of information-based technology, the most obvious challenge is to design a legal framework that is 
adaptable to technological change and its impact on financial instruments. Arguably, the US approach has 
the benefit of making the disclosure and reporting regime adaptive to the technological evolution in 
financial market instruments. Additionally, the US disclosure system is adaptive to different types of 
beneficial owners that invest with different intentions. At one end of the spectrum, Section 13(d) of the 
Exchange Act requires beneficial owners who seek control to disclose their ultimate intentions in detail.  
At the other end of the spectrum, Section 13(g) of the Exchange Act enables certain “passive investors” 
without any intention to control the company (including qualified institutional investors that have no 
control purpose) to file a short-form document.  
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 See WorldBank IFC, Doing Business 2011, Making a Difference for Entrepreneurs (www.doingbusiness.org). 
40
 See L. Enriques, M. Gargantini and V. Novembre, Mandatory and Contract-based Shareholding Disclosure, 
Uniform Law Review 15, 2010. See also Section 1.3 of this paper. 
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 See B. Bloch, Information Overload: How It Hurts Investors, 28 April 2011 (www.investopedia.com). 
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 See Nik Ramlah Mahmood, Monitoring Beneficial Ownership, Challenges and Way Forward for Indonesia, 
presented at the OECD-Indonesia Policy Dialogue: Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and Control, Bali, 
5 October 2011. 
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 Insiders, such as directors and officers, who own certain equity securities must file a statement 
that contains the number of equity securities of which the insider is the beneficial owner under Section 16 
of the Exchange Act. If we compare Section 13 to Section 16, it becomes evident that the US system 
clearly distinguishes between outside blockholders and inside blockholders. Consider in this respect the 
following provision in Section 16: “(f)or the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which 
may have been obtained by (an insider) by reason of his relationship to the (listed company), any profit 
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such 
issuer” within any period of less than six months inures to and is recoverable by the company. Clearly, the 
distinction between inside blockholders and outside blockholders is relevant if one believes that the latter‟s 
engagement in a listed company significantly reduces “vertical agency costs” by closely monitoring 
management. 
 The underlying issues caused by stringent and inflexible transparency regimes can also be 
avoided by providing optional investigative mechanisms that listed companies and public agencies can opt 
into at their own discretion. Examples can be found in China and Malaysia. Malaysian listed companies, 
for instance, may request its shareholders to unveil detailed beneficial ownership information beyond the 
legal and regulatory requirements. Likewise, the Registrar of Companies at the Companies Commission 
may submit a similar request. Another example of an optional investigative system can be found in the 
Capital Markets & Services Act 2007 (CMSA). Section 317(1) imposes on directors of listed companies a 
duty to inform the company about any of its shares they own. The Securities Commission may request this 
information if it deems necessary. This seems particularly the case if the director is considered to be an 
internal blockholder (holding a significant number of shares in the listed company).  
 
Figure 4: A balance sheet for disclose and reporting regimes 
Benefits Costs 
High level of disclosure and reporting requirements 
 
Ultimate controlling beneficial owners 
 
If ownership is control-related, intentions should be 
reported and disclosed    
 
Control-enhancing mechanisms (see next Section) 
 
Easy and online accessibility to up-to-date and “real 
time” information 
 
Examples: EDGAR, Bursa LINK,  
CONSOB 
 
Flexible rules adaptable to technological change and 
innovative financial instruments 
 
Exchange Act United States (case-by-case) 
 
Capital Markets & Services Act 2007  
Malaysia (opt-in rules) 
Strict and stringent rules and regulations 
 
Discourages outside blockholders’ engagement 
 







The focus must be on control 
 
“Immaterial” information must not be disclosed 
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 The investigative mechanisms ensure that Malaysia‟s disclosure and reporting regime is applied 
proportionately and only if and when necessary to help avoid information overload. Indeed, the policy 
makers and regulators in Malaysia appear to have implemented a well-designed disclosure and reporting 
regime that mainly targets beneficial owners that seek to acquire control over a listed company. Recall that 
a disclosure and reporting regime could target several types of beneficial owners: (1) passive beneficial 
owners who are only interested in a company‟s share price, (2) beneficial owners who monitor the 
performance of listed companies and initiate dialogues with management, and (3) beneficial owners that 
seek to acquire control over a listed company. Moreover, the information obtained from depositories by 
Bursa Malaysia Depository Sdn Bhd will not become publicly available. 
 The effectiveness of the rules and regulations, however, depends largely on the enforcement 
capabilities of the regulators and other public agents. Indeed, one of the concerns with the corporate 
governance infrastructure in Malaysia was that while there were extensive laws and other regulations that 
govern, among other things, disclosure and transparency issues in listed companies, there existed a 
significant gap between the “rules in the books” and the “rules in practice”.
43
  
 The final part of the paper shows that Malaysia, by improving its enforcement system, has taken 
important steps to bridge this gap. Still, no matter how valuable the disclosed information is, the discussed 
disclosure regimes do not guarantee that the true picture about the control and ownership structure of a 
listed company is available. For instance, shareholders could have entered into arrangements that give 
them control in excess of ownership (without having to publicly disclose their direct position in the 
company). It is necessary to disclose these arrangements as well as any other so-called control-enhancing 
mechanisms in order to provide an accurate picture of the control and ownership structure of listed 
companies. In the next section, the rules and regulations regarding control-enhancing mechanisms are 
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3. DISCLOSURE OF CONTROL-ENHANCING MECHANISMS AND ARRANGEMENTS 
 The Google case (see Box 1) showed that minority investors may have good reasons to acquire 
shares in a listed company that employs control-enhancing mechanisms (if these mechanisms meet the 
company‟s specific governance needs and requirements).
44
 In order to protect minority investors, policy 
makers and legislatures should consider introducing clear disclosure and transparency obligations. In this 
respect, it is worth taking a closer look at the European Takeover Bids Directive,
45
 which complements the 
Transparency Directive by requiring listed companies to provide investors with adequate information about 
deviations from the standard rule that voting rights (control) equal cash-flow rights (ownership). The 
rationale behind the Directive is twofold. Firstly, the disclosure of control and ownership information 
enables investors to make well-informed choices about their investments. Secondly, the reporting 
requirement discourages deviations from the best-practice norm in corporate governance that one share can 
only correspond to one vote (the “one-share-one-vote” rule). 
 The Directive‟s transparency requirement is directly relevant to the disclosure of beneficial 
ownership and control-enhancing mechanisms.
46
 While it may true that the Directive is imperfect in that it 
does not directly addresses the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling beneficial owners, the 
increased disclosure and transparency is arguably crucial to effectively regulate the financial market, while 
at the same time, discouraging market manipulation and abusive tactics.
47
 Again, it should be noted here 
that many of the negative effects of control-enhancing mechanisms do not appear to have prevented the 
efficient operation of the financial market in Europe as well as in the United States. As we have seen, 
control-enhancing mechanisms can under circumstances even have a positive effect on the performance of 
listed companies. In order to draw informed conclusions regarding the effect of an effective disclosure 
regime on control-enhancing mechanisms, it is therefore important to discuss experiences in other 
jurisdictions.  
3.1 Comparative Overview 
3.1.1 Italy 
 Control-enhancing mechanisms, particularly shareholders agreements and pyramid structures, are 
common in Italy. The large established listed companies are the usual suspects.  Empirical research shows 
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 In particular, Article 10 mandates that companies must provide detailed information on: (1) the structure of their 
capital, including securities not admitted to trading on a regulated market, with an indication, where 
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percentage of capital it represents; (2) any restrictions on the transfer of securities; (3) significant direct and 
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governing the appointment and replacement of board members and the amendment of articles of 
association; (9) the powers of board members, particularly in respect of the right to buy back shares; (10) 
significant agreements to which the company is a party and that take effect upon a change of control of the 
company; (11) any agreement between the company and its board member or employees providing for 
compensation if they resign or are made redundant without valid reason or if their employment ceases 
because of a successful takeover bid; and (12) this information must be published in the company‟s annual 
report. 
47
 See J.A. McCahery and E.P.M. Vermeulen, The Case Against Reform of the Takeover Bids Directive, 22 European 
Business Law Review 2011. 
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that 85% of these companies employ one or more control-enhancing mechanisms.
48
 As noted, these 
mechanisms could encourage expropriation of minority interests through corporate diversification 
strategies. However, the ongoing disclosure requirements, largely based on the mandatory implementation 
of the Transparency Directive and Takeover Bids Directive, ensure that minority investors have the 
necessary insights in the control structure of Italian listed companies to understand their minority position. 
Article 123-bis of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance provides that control-enhancing mechanisms 
must be disclosed in the annual report. 
3.1.2 The United States 
 In the United States, the “one-share-one-vote” rule is common. Shareholders holding more than 
5% of any class of voting equity securities must file a Schedule 13D with the SEC. In addition to applying 
to individual investors, the beneficial ownership reporting provisions of Section 13 of the Exchange Act 
also apply to groups of investors. Sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) of the Exchange Act provide that when 
two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a 
“person”. Application of these statutory provisions therefore results in an aggregation of the ownership 
interests of two or more persons acting in concert, and requires that a beneficial ownership report be filed 
by the members of the group when the amount the group members collectively beneficially own exceeds 
5% of the class of equity securities. Related Exchange Act Rule 13d-5(b)(1) operates to further help 
determine when two or more persons should be deemed to be a “group.” Rule 13d-5(b)(1) shows the 
disclosure‟s system flexibility by setting forth a test for whether two or more persons constitute a group. 
The test is twofold. Firstly, there must be an agreement to act together. The agreement need not be in 
written form. Secondly, in determining whether persons agreed to act together, the SEC and the courts look 
to circumstances such as contacts between persons, parallel action by persons and whether persons had 
similar goals. Under Rule 13d-5(b)(1), persons will be viewed as having formed a group if they agree to 
act together for purposes of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of the subject equity securities. 
3.1.3 China 
 Control-enhancing mechanisms are widely employed in family-owned listed companies and 
state-owned enterprises in China (see Table 3). Yet, the use of pyramid ownership structures is declining. 
Recent research shows that 98% of the listed companies were characterized by pyramid ownership 
structures in 2002. In 2007, this percentage proportion decreased to 87%.
49
 The downward trend is partly 
explained by the improved and more stringent corporate governance infrastructure in China, which 





Table 3: The use of control-enhancing mechanisms (pyramids) in China in 2007 
Controlling Owner Share ownership Voting control Direct share ownership of 
second largest shareholder 
Family 26% 35% 9% 
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Controlling Owner Share ownership Voting control Direct share ownership of 
second largest shareholder 
Non-family 35% 39% 7% 
State 36% 40% 7% 
Source: R. Amit, Y. Ding, B. Villalonga, H. Zhang, The Role of Institutional Development in the Prevalence and Value of Family Firms, 
Harvard Business School Working Paper 10-103, 2010. 
3.1.4 Indonesia 
 In Indonesia, families remain in control over “their” listed companies by setting up pyramid 
structures. A study conducted in 2000 reports that 67% of the listed companies have pyramid structures 
(see Table 4). Unfortunately, there is no recent information available. This is mainly due to the fact that 
listed companies are not required to disclose control-enhancing mechanisms. 
Table 4: The use of control-enhancing mechanisms in other Asian countries 
Country Ratio of cash flow to voting 
rights 
Pyramids with ultimate 
owners 
Cross-holdings 
Indonesia 0,784 67% 1% 
Malaysia 0,853 39% 15% 
Philippines 0,908 40% 7% 
Singapore 0,794 55% 16% 
Thailand 0,941 13% 1% 
Japan 0,602 36% 12% 
Korea 0,858 43% 9% 
Source: S. Claessen, S. Djankov and L.H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 Journal 
of Financial Economics 81, 2000. 
3.1.5 Malaysia 
 Also, controlling shareholders in Malaysia tended to use pyramid and cross-holding structures to 
diversify their risk, while at the same time exercising control over the companies (see Table 4).
51
 However, 
the popularity of pyramid structures have slowly but surely faded away due to the more stringent 
disclosure and related party requirements.
52
 For instance, in the current corporate governance 
infrastructure, company law and listing requirements make it mandatory for investors to disclose 
shareholder agreements and acting in concert strategies if they together with the other shareholders control 
5% or more of the outstanding shares of the company. 
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 32 
3.2 Key findings and main messages 
 We have seen that rules and regulations that require blockholders to disclose the use of control-
enhancing mechanisms have a significant effect on the incidence of these mechanisms. Tightening the 
disclosure regime will not only lead to more transparency, but will at the same time decrease the use (and 
popularity) of these mechanisms. The question arises of what the balance sheet is for transparency in the 
area of control-enhancing mechanisms (see Figure 5). The benefits are obvious. A lack of sufficient and 
effective reporting requirements facilitates market manipulation and abuse.  
 For instance, control-enhancing mechanisms, which are used to allow inside blockholders to 
enhance control by leveraging voting power, lead to an increased potential for fraud and tunneling. 
Moreover these mechanisms often function as devices for inside blockholders to capture and lock-in board 
and management control while being a minority investor. In fact, if the possibility of shareholders to “vote 
with their feet” by tendering their shares to a hostile offeror (who seeks to acquire control over the 
company) is severely threatened as a result of control-enhancing arrangements, market mechanisms cannot 
adequately align the interests of inside blockholders (and management) and other minority shareholders.  
 By providing a constant and credible risk of hostile acquisitions, the takeover market creates a 
powerful incentive for management of a listed company to restrain from managerial self-dealing. 
Assuming that the “market-for-corporate-control” is economically efficient in that it improves firm 
performance, control-enhancing mechanisms lead to an increase in both “vertical” and “horizontal agency 
problems”. Consequently, according to this argument, disclosure and reporting rules and regulations should 
at least ensure that non-controlling minority investors have adequate and up-to-date information about a 
listed company‟s control structure. 
Figure 5: A balance sheet for the disclosure of control-enhancing mechanisms 
Benefits Costs 
Strict disclosure rules 
 
Information about a listed company’s control structure 
must be made available to non-controlling minority 
investors on a regular basis. 
Strict disclosure rules 
 
Discourages the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. 




 The costs of reporting control-enhancing mechanisms are harder to measure. One potential cost is 
that disclosure may encourage firms to abandon a governance structure even if it matches their needs in the 
growth and development stage. As discussed, fast-growing and high-tech companies sometimes use 
multiple-voting shares. The rationale is sound and simple. The possibility to issue multiple voting shares 
allows founders of high tech companies to raise substantial sums of capital without surrendering control. If 
information about control-enhancing mechanisms negatively affects a company‟s stock price, successful 
high tech companies will probably refrain from a public listing. This may not only seriously hamper the 
development of these companies, but also negatively influence economic growth and job creation 
initiatives.  
 Yet, even though it follows from the discussion in Section 2.1 that more stringent disclosure 
regimes often lead to a decrease in the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, investors in listed high-tech 
companies seem to be more than happy with the imbalance in the control and ownership structure of their 
investee company. We already discussed the Google example. Discussions about IPOs by other fast-
growing companies, such as Zynga and Groupon, seem to indicate that multiple voting rights shares 
become more in fashion in the high tech industry. This suggests that the (potential) investors are able to 
distinguish companies that legitimately and proportionally implement control mechanisms from companies 
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with disproportional or inefficient structures.
53
 This observation could lead to the conclusion that strict 
disclosure and reporting rules for control-enhancing mechanisms are beneficial to investors and the 
financial market in general. 
 This conclusion should not be surprising to anyone who has read the paper so far: disclosure and 
reporting is absolutely necessary when it involves control-related information. This raises the question as 
to whether there are alternative sources of information available to minority investors who have an interest 
in pursuing an investigation in the control structures of listed companies when the discussed mechanisms 
fail. Consider here the rules to protect society against money laundering, terrorist financing and other illicit 
activities. Indeed, because controlling beneficial owners usually use national and/or offshore corporate 
vehicles to shield their assets from personal liability and, at the same time, hide their identity, anti-money 
laundering and anti-terrorism rules arguably assist minority investors in their effort to reconstruct the 
control structure of a listed company. The next Section analyzes whether minority investors can actually 
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4. DISCLOSURE OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF CORPORATE VEHICLES 
 Modern corporate vehicles are diverse and serve a range of complex needs for business parties. 
At their core, they allow business people to carry out important commercial activities. Organizing these 
activities through corporate vehicles solves a number of contracting problems while contributing to the 
development of a sophisticated and complex economic environment. The flexibility and adaptability of 
corporate vehicles to accommodate the financial and organizational needs of entrepreneurs and investors 
have arguably contributed to the deepening of financial markets. Irrespective of how effective these forms 
might be for meeting the needs of a broad range of businesses and investors, there have been increasing 
concerns about the degree to which these forms are used for tax evasion, money laundering, and other 
illegal or abusive transactions. The financial market and banking systems become more international and, 
in important respects, encourage the development of financial centers. As these centers become more 
established and accessible, an increasing number of individuals, businesses and opportunistic investors are 
likely to take advantage of the usually flexible regulation and gate-keeping systems in these centers. 
 For instance, offshore financial centers are not only attractive due to the flexible financial 
supervision, bank secrecy laws and beneficial fiscal treatment, but equally so due to their usually 
accessible rules regarding the formation and operation of corporate vehicles.
54
 It is a common refrain that 
controlling beneficial owners of company shares frequently involve the use of offshore corporate vehicles 
or international holding structures to conceal the true identity of the shareholders. In fact, some of the 
major offshore jurisdictions have encouraged investors to move capital and use their financial institutions 
by creating legislation that effectively restrict the identity of the beneficial owners of the company. Along 
with the instruments for achieving anonymity, there are also a variety of legal measures, such as 
restrictions on gatekeepers and service providers to assist regulators with determining the true identity of 
parties that also allow money launders and others pursuing criminal schemes to invest with minimal 
scrutiny. 
 As we have seen, there are a number of techniques that make it difficult to establish the true 
ownership of a company, such as bearer shares and nominee shareholders. Modern corporate vehicles,
55
 
which are even less regulated than the traditional corporate form for listed companies, are even more apt 
for establishing chains of corporate vehicles. Lighter rules and regulation provide these entities with a 
more flexible structure. They can be established cheaply and often online within 24 hours. These 
characteristics make these types of business forms more vulnerable to misuse for illicit purposes. More 
importantly in the context of this paper, controlling beneficial owners of listed companies could take 
advantage of the light regulation of these modern business forms to hide their identity and perpetrate a 
wide range of illegal or abusive activities. We already noted that inside blockholders often hide their 
identity by establishing a chain of local and offshore corporate vehicles. 
 This Section begins with a review of the legitimate aims of corporate vehicles and their potential 
for misuse by parties to engage in illicit activities. We describe and analyze the competing methods for 
identifying beneficial ownership and control. The primary objective of this Section is to assess whether the 
disclosure regime for corporate vehicles can be used as an investigative tool for minority investors and 
other stakeholders to obtain information about the beneficial ownership and control structures, including 
the identity of beneficial owners, of listed companies. 
                                                     
54
 See OECD, Behind the Corporate Veil: Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes, 2001. 
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 See F.R. Reyes and E.P.M. Vermeulen, Company Law. Lawyers and Innovation: Common Law versus Civil Law, 
Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics 2011-3 Working Paper (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907894). See also J.A. McCahery, E.P.M. Vermeulen, M. Hisatake and J. Saito, 
Traditional and Innovative Approaches to Legal reform: „the New Company Law‟, 8 European Business 
Organization Law Review 7, 2007. 
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4.1 Corporate vehicles and their potential for misuse 
 There are many techniques available to move money swiftly and effectively to evade tax 
authorities and other enforcement officials. Specialists on financial crime and money laundering frequently 
note that perpetrators seek to avoid detection by creating a chain of company law vehicles in separate 
jurisdictions. Corporations, trusts, foundations, limited partnerships and now hybrid business forms, such 
as the limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability companies (LLCs), are the vehicles most 
commonly associated with misuse. These corporate vehicles are relatively simple and cost efficient to set 
up. For example, an offshore company acts as nominee for an offshore principal. In this construction, the 
nominee company represents the offshore company, and transacts all the contracts and conducts the 
business on its behalf, including invoicing and accounting.  
 The advantages are that no invoices or other papers will appear in the file of the offshore 
principal. Such a construction, moreover, assumes that the nominee company will not trade in its country 
of incorporation, buy or sell goods in its own name, and sign contracts with the nominee company outside 
its home jurisdiction. In order to develop the chain, parties will go on to establish companies in a third 
jurisdiction and so forth. Setting up a chain of corporate vehicles is usually a cost-effective solution for 
multinationals in their efforts to establish corporate structures that help optimize the financial results of the 
group of companies. However, the anonymity created by these structures serves to benefit those involved 
in criminal activities. In this context, jurisdictions have moved to introduce measures that make 
information about the beneficial owners that control these chains of companies more readily available. 
 The OECD (2001), which is concerned with combating corruption and money laundering, has 
articulated a number of policy objectives in respect of preventing the misuse of corporate vehicles. The 
emphasis on restricting their misuse is in line with other international initiatives that seek to establish the 
appropriate standards to assist authorities and financial institutions that could effectively stem cross-border 
crime.  
 As far as jurisdictions have mechanisms that make it possible to obtain access to beneficial 
ownership information, it is emphasized that proper oversight and high integrity of the system is necessary 
to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information. It is submitted that the misuse of legal entities can 
be limited by the maintenance and sharing of information on beneficial ownership and control through a 
number of mechanisms. These alternative mechanisms include: (1) an up-front disclosure system;
56
 (2) 
mandating corporate service providers to maintain beneficial ownership information;
57
 and (3) primary 
reliance on an investigative system.
58
 Table 5 provides a “balance sheet” overview of the costs and benefits 
of each of these mechanisms. 
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 An up-front disclosure system requires the disclosure of the beneficial ownership and control of corporate entities 
to the authorities, chambers of commerce or any other institutions charged with responsibility at the 
establishment or incorporation stage and imposes an obligation to update such information on a timely 
basis when changes occur. The obligation to report beneficial ownership and control information to the 
authorities may be placed on the corporate entity, the ultimate beneficial owner, or the corporate service 
provider involved in the establishment or management of the corporate entity. 
57
 In some jurisdictions, intermediaries involved in the establishment and management of corporate entities, such as 
company formation agents, trust companies, registered agents, lawyers, notaries, trustees, and companies 
supplying nominee shareholders, directors, and officers (“corporate service providers”), are required to 
obtain, verify, and retain records on the (beneficial) ownership and control of the corporate entities that 
they establish, administer, or for which they provide fiduciary services. 
58
 Under an investigative system, the authorities seek to obtain (through compulsory powers, court-issued subpoenas, 
and other measures) beneficial ownership and control information when illicit activity is suspected, when 
such information is required by authorities to fulfill their regulatory/supervisory functions, or when such 
information is requested by other authorities domestically and internationally for regulatory/supervisory or 
law enforcement purposes. 
 36 
Table 5: OECD options for obtaining beneficial ownership information
59
 
Option Benefits Costs 
Upfront disclosure • improved transparency 
• beneficial ownership and control 
information available at all times 
• strong deterrent effect 
• imposes significant costs on 
business vehicles (especially 
smaller entrepreneurial 
businesses) 
The holding of information by 
intermediaries 
• implementation is cheap • costly and time-consuming for 
companies (particularly when 
foreign parties are involved) 
• the client identification and 
verification rules, and related 
recordkeeping requirements, 
represent a potentially costly and 
cumbersome set of identification 
practices. 
• potential for delays in the 
provision of information ex post  
Investigative system • may avoid unnecessary costs and 
burdens on business vehicles, 
which may stifle legitimate 
business formations 
• maintain a reasonable balance 
between ensuring proper 
monitoring / regulation of 
business vehicles and protecting 
legitimate privacy interests 
• potential for delays in the 
provision of information 
 
 The OECD approach is based on the premise that the most effective technique to identify the 
beneficial owner is to, when necessary, pierce through the legal form of corporate vehicles in order to 
obtain information about the legal owner of the shares or the party that exercises effective control over the 
vehicle. The argument for pursuing this strategy is largely pragmatic, namely that there are an array of 
effective legal techniques available that permit regulators and other parties to obtain such information. The 
supervisory authorities, in some markets, subject financial intermediaries involved in the creation of such 
corporate vehicles to obtain a written declaration of the identity of the beneficial owner and renew 
verification of the identity of the contracting party or beneficial owner when changes occur during the 
operation of the business. Not only must financial intermediaries obtain the identification of the beneficial 
owner, but are bound to establish documents, make the information available to supervisory authorities and 
retain the information long after the business relationship has ended.  
 At a fundamental level, we see that the misuse of corporate vehicles can be controlled by a 
combination of mechanisms. Thus the choice between the particular mechanisms will be influenced by the 
efficacy of the legal system and the enforcement history and level of cross-border cooperation in the 
market. Differences in the legal traditions and culture will arguably complicate the exchange of 
information on an international level. In principle, the solution to the problem of disclosure of beneficial 
ownership appears to be straightforward: (1) introduce a strong national up-front disclosure system and 
investigative system and (2) establish international collaborations to facilitate the cross-border exchange of 
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 See OECD, Options for Obtaining Beneficial Ownership and Control Information, February 2002. 
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information among regulators. As we will see in the next subsection, the elements of a sound system of 
disclosure of beneficial ownership are well known by policy makers. 
4.2 Combating illicit use of corporate vehicles in Europe 
 Over the last decade or so, the European Union has undertaken to implement uniform rules in 
order to curb the misuse of financial centers by criminal organizations and to contain money laundering. 
Money laundering is defined as the process by which a party conceals the illegal existence, illegal source 
or illegal application of income and then disguises it in order to make it appear legitimate. Money 
laundering typically involves a three-step process: placement, layering and integration. There is little 
disagreement about the steps needed to minimize the incidence of money laundering. However, because 
money laundering involves numerous forms of corruption, it is difficult to identify, let alone prosecute 
successfully. Given the harm that money laundering causes to financial markets and the effect that it has in 
undermining confidence in government and public officials, it is argued that strengthening the weak links 
in regulation is needed. Particularly, financial intermediaries, who usually have knowledge of the assets 
implicated in these transactions and a relationship with the persons that operate the corporate vehicles 
connected to these illicit activities, play a pivotal role. 
 In 2005, the European Commission embraced the Third Directive on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, which had to be 
implemented by 15 December 2007.
60
 This Directive builds on existing EU legislation and incorporates the 
June 2003 revision of the Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (see Box 4). 
It repealed and replaced the 1991 Directive,
61
 as amended in 2001, with the difference that it introduces 
additional requirements and safeguards for situations of higher risks, such as trading with banks located 
outside the European Union.  
 In the context of the formation and operation of corporate vehicles, the Directive not only applies 
to financial services providers, such as auditors, external accountants and tax advisors, but also to legal 
professionals when they assist their clients in the creation, operation or management of trusts, companies 
or similar structures. For instance, legal professionals must engage in continuous due diligence activities 
throughout the course of their relationship with clients to (1) identify their clients and, more importantly, 
verify their identity on the basis of information obtained from a reliable source, (2) identify the beneficial 
owner of a client who is a legal person, trust or similar legal structure (see Box 5), (3) understand the 
ownership and control structure of the corporate client, and (4) report suspicious transactions to the 
national financial intelligence unit (FIU).  
 The due diligence and reporting obligations present challenges for legal professionals at two 
levels.
62
 Firstly, the “know your client” rules and requirements represent potentially costly and 
cumbersome due diligence activities. Secondly, and more worrisome, tensions arise between 
“transparency” (i.e., the reporting obligation of legal professionals that detect or suspect illicit use of 
corporate vehicles) and “secrecy” (i.e., client confidentiality and lawyer-client privilege).
63
 These tensions 
made it necessary for FATF to draft and develop principles for legal professionals that help combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing without undermining the lawyer-client privilege, the duty of client 
confidentiality or otherwise impeding the delivery of legal services generally. This led to the introduction 
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    Box 4. The Financial Action Task Force 
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body charged with promoting the development of 
and compliance with standards to efficiently curtail the effects of money laundering and terrorist financing. In order 
to meet this objective the FATF has issued Forty Recommendations, which – together with Nine Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing – provide a complete set of principles and standards against money 
laundering. These international standards – collectively called the “40+9 Recommendations” – are introduced to 
assist countries in developing a “risk-based approach” to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
In addition to the 40+9 Recommendations, the FATF has promulgated a number of supplementary documents that 
are aimed to assist its member countries in implementing the Recommendations. 
 
However, devising and maintaining a legal system that ensures that accurate and timely disclosure of beneficial 
ownership and control structures is a daunting task. Existing systems should be revisited periodically. It is therefore 
not surprising that FATF published its revised FATF Recommendations in February 2012. The FATF 
Recommendations (2012) contain, among other things, measures that are expected to significantly improve 
transparency regarding beneficial ownership structures. For instance, the 2012 Recommendations encourage 
countries to implement stricter rules and regulations that require companies or company registries to obtain and 
hold up-to-date information on the companies’ beneficial ownership. 
 
As for the “customer due diligence” (CDD) for legal persons and arrangements, The FATF Recommendations 
(2012) state that: When performing CDD measures in relation to customers that are legal persons or legal 
arrangements, financial institutions should be required to identify and verify the customer, and understand the 
nature of its business, and its ownership and control structure. The purpose of the requirements […] regarding the 
identification and verification of the customer and the beneficial owner, is twofold: first, to prevent the unlawful use 
of legal persons and arrangements, by gaining a sufficient understanding of the customer to be able to properly 
assess the potential money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with the business relationship; and, 
second, to take appropriate steps to mitigate the risks. As two aspects of one process, these requirements are likely 
to interact and complement each other naturally.  
 
  
 The 2008 Lawyer Guidance applies to legal professionals who engage in one of the five 
designated activities (e.g., those who help clients who buy or sell real estate; help create, manage or 
operate legal persons; or establish or manage trusts or hold client‟s money).
65
 The document was well 
received by the legal profession in that it adopted a risk-based approach (as opposed to the more detailed 
rules-based approach). A risk-based approach acknowledges that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to 
the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism. Instead, it is founded on the premise that 
there are finite resources to detect and sanction money laundering and terrorism finance activities. The 
upshot is that the greatest risks should receive the most attention. For legal professionals, this means that 
they should focus on their client‟s location, the nature of their business and the nature of the services 
requested when assessing whether they are engaged in money laundering or other illicit transactions. 
Unfortunately, it is too early to assess whether the 2008 Lawyer Guidance generated the coveted effect. It 
is clear, however, that differences in legal cultures and systems hamper the speedy implementation and 
development of the 2008 Lawyer Guidance.  
 The Guidance explicitly states that the scope of the terms “legal professional privilege” and 
“professional secrecy” should be determined by the respective countries. Since these terms have different 
connotations in different legal cultures, the Lawyer Guidance has not (yet) been able to create a level-
playing field for legal services in international transactions.
66
 In the next subsection, we will discuss 
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 39 
various instruments that countries introduced when approaching the regulation of beneficial ownership in 
an effort to prevent illicit use of corporate vehicles. 
Box 5. Beneficial Ownership in the Third Directive (an example) 
 
Beneficial owner means the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls the customer and/or the natural person 
on whose behalf a transaction or activity is being conducted. The beneficial owner shall at least include:  
(a)  in the case of corporate entities:  
(i)  the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a legal entity through direct or indirect ownership or control 
over a sufficient percentage of the shares or voting rights in that legal entity, including through bearer share holdings, 
other than a company listed on a regulated market that is subject to disclosure requirements consistent with 
Community legislation or subject to equivalent international standards; a percentage of 25 % plus one share shall be 
deemed sufficient to meet this criterion;  
(ii)  the natural person(s) who otherwise exercises control over the management of a legal entity:  
(b)  in the case of legal entities, such as foundations, and legal arrangements, such as trusts, which administer and 
distribute funds:  
(i)  where the future beneficiaries have already been determined, the natural person(s) who is the beneficiary of 25 % 
or more of the property of a legal arrangement or entity;  
(ii)  where the individuals that benefit from the legal arrangement or entity have yet to be determined, the class of 
persons in whose main interest the legal arrangement or entity is set up or operates;  
(iii)  the natural person(s) who exercises control over 25 % or more of the property of a legal arrangement or entity. 
4.3 Comparative overview 
 As discussed, three mechanisms can be used to obtain access to beneficial ownership information 
upon the creation of a corporate vehicle: (1) an up-front disclosure system; (2) mandating corporate service 
providers to maintain beneficial ownership information; and (3) primary reliance on an investigative 
system. In the analyzed countries, governments often rely on an up-front identification system by service 
providers. For instance, in Italy, corporate vehicles are generally incorporated through a public deed of 
incorporation, which must be drafted and executed before a public notary by the first shareholders or their 
authorized representatives. Under the European Directive rules, the notary must engage in an “upfront” 
identification process.  
 The private company (Perseroan Terbatas) is the choice of corporate vehicle in Indonesia, which 
must be established by at least two persons. In addition: (1) the incorporation documents have to be 
notarized before a notary public and (2) the deed of establishment must be approved by the Ministry of 
Law and Human Rights. The role of the notaries in the incorporation process is merely limited to the 
notarization of the formation documents. They do not have an obligation to identify the founders or the 
beneficial owner of a founding entity under the “know your customer principles” of Law Number 8 of 
2010 on Prevention and Eradication of the Crime of Money Laundering.
67
 However, according to article 41 
of the Law 8/2010, Indonesia‟s national financial intelligence unit, PPATK, is authorized to request for and 
obtain information from private institutions, such as lawyers, accountants and notaries, if this information 
is deemed necessary to prevent and eradicate money laundering activities. 
 China appears to use a true upfront identification system by requiring a corporate vehicle to 
obtain a registration certification “business license of enterprise legal person” with the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) or a local equivalent. The registration certification can 
only be obtained after submission of the identity cards of shareholders and identification documents of 
officers.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
obtain information regarding foreign clients. See European Commission, Meeting with EU Private 
Stakeholders on Anti-Money laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Policy, 17 February 2011. 
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 Law Number 8 of 2010 substituted Law Number 15 of 2002 (amended by Law 25/2003) on The Crime of Money 
Laundering only applied to financial service providers. 
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 The incorporation procedures in Malaysia allow for an electronic filing or lodging of documents 
required by the Companies Act. A person who intends to use the service must become a subscriber by 
paying a prescribed fee and by complying with such terms and conditions determined by the Registrar. The 
incorporation procedure seems to be less demanding than the incorporation procedures in Italy, China and 
Indonesia. However, in addition to the electronic filing facility, the Companies Act also makes it 
mandatory to update the information in the register of substantial shareholders and register of directors‟ 
shareholding whenever there are changes. Not complying with the relevant provisions in the Companies 
Act is an offense where penalty or imprisonment may be imposed against the company and/or its officers. 
The Companies Act also provides a facultative upfront disclosure and investigative system. Firstly, it 
authorizes the Registrar to request for information about the owners of any share acquired or held directly 
or indirectly either for their own benefit or for any other company (Section 69A). Secondly, and more 
importantly, the Minister responsible for companies (currently the Minister of Domestic Trade in 
Malaysia) may initiate an investigation on the ownership of the company (Section 207) or require more 
information as to the persons interested in a company (Section 208). 
 Finally, the incorporation procedures in the United States are simple and do not generally require 
the provision of the names of the beneficial owners. With respect to obtaining information about corporate 
vehicles, the United States operates under an investigative system, under which authorities seek to obtain 
(through compulsory powers, court-issued subpoenas and other measures) beneficial ownership and 
control information when illicit activity is suspected, when such information is required by authorities to 
fulfill their regulatory/supervisory functions, and in other appropriate situations. Oversight authorities in 
specific industries at various governmental levels may require beneficial ownership information as a 
condition of licensure or other approval of operations. 
4.4 Key findings and main messages  
 In order to obtain information about beneficial ownership and control structures of listed 
companies, there are three possible disclosure systems for obtaining extensive disclosure information about 
the chain of corporate vehicles that are often employed by beneficial owners to conceal their identity and 
intentions. There is clear evidence of a correlation between the ability to obscure the identity of beneficial 
owners and the use of corporate vehicles to carry out illegal activities. The incidence of illegal activities, 
such as money laundering and terrorist financing, carried out through corporate vehicles suggest that this 
type of problem cannot be ignored and may require a comprehensive solution. However, there may not be 
one efficient solution and the appropriate system for a particular country may change over time to conform 
to local conditions and company law traditions. 
 In this context, it is noteworthy that recently US Senators Levin and Grassley introduced for the 
third time the “Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act”. Under this proposal, 
the incorporation of corporate vehicles in the United States would require the collection and retention for 
beneficial owners of identity information for beneficial owners (names, addresses, driver‟s license or 
passport number) of corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs) which are not publicly traded or 
regulated. Moreover, the beneficial ownership information would be subject to subpoena by law 
enforcement. Despite the fact that promulgation of the Act would lead to a significant increase of the costs 
of incorporating in the United States, the Senators argue that the identification procedures will have a 
positive impact on the prevention of money laundering and illicit use of legal vehicles.  
 In practice, however, the upfront identification of a client (either by public agents or 
intermediaries) who wants to set up a corporate vehicle is not without difficulties. To give just one 
example, the identification of residents of foreign countries could severely hamper and delay the formation 
process. Besides the cultural resistance of some countries to deliver supporting evidence for their residents‟ 
identification, clients often provide incorrect or uncertified copies of supporting documents, which 
increases the transaction costs regarding the formation and operation of corporate vehicles. Despite these 
extra costs, professional organizations representing legal service providers are of the opinion that the 
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identification (know your client) procedures have a positive impact on the prevention of money laundering 
and financing of terrorism.
68
  
 Still, we can observe that the company law reforms increasingly enable business parties to set up 
corporate vehicles without the intervention of professionals. It could be argued that this trend would only 
simplify the money laundering process. However, one must bear in mind that corporate vehicles, in order 
to conduct activities, often have to open bank accounts that require the submission of VAT and corporate 
ID numbers. In fact, financial institutions remain the most suitable parties to prevent and combat money 
laundering. In this view, lawyers and other legal professionals provide an extra layer that serves as a safety 
net in the prevention of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering.
69
  
 The above discussion leads to a conundrum for policy makers and legislatures in that they have to 
take at least two main objectives of the law of corporate vehicles into account that may even be 
inconsistent and mutually exclusive. The main objectives of the law are: (1) offer an organizational 
structure for parties to conduct their business in a way that is consistent with the “public interest” of 
society (the prevention of illicit activities), and (2) offer a corporate vehicle form that shuns formation and 
operation requirements, thereby spurring entrepreneurship and innovation. It appears that the latter 
function of company law prevails in firms operating in knowledge-intense sectors.  
 Given the importance of entrepreneurship and innovation, governments around the world tend to 
streamline and modernize their incorporation requirements in order to become more competitive and obtain 
a better position in the competitiveness rankings (see for example Table 6). For instance, governments 
introduce simplified incorporation procedures in order to make it possible to use online systems that 
facilitate electronic filings of new business registrations.
70
 Obviously, the online systems bypass lawyers 
and other legal service providers in the incorporation process (see also Box 6). It should therefore come as 
no surprise that US Senator Levin, who in 2009 already introduced a bill that would require states to 
collect and maintain beneficial ownership information upon the incorporation of these vehicles, has so far 
been unsuccessful.  
Table 6: Starting a Business in 2011 
Economy Procedures (number) Time (days) 
Cost (% of income per 
capita) 
East Asia & Pacific 7.8 39.0 27.1 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 
6.3 16.3 8.5 
OECD 5.6 13.8 5.3 
South Asia 7.1 24.6 24.5 
China 14 38 4.5 
Indonesia 9 47 22.3 
                                                     
68
 American Bar Association, Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 23 April 2010. See also L.P. Cummings and Paul T. Stepnowsky, My 
Brother‟s Keeper: AN Empirical Study of Attorney Facilitation of Money-Laundering through Commercial 
Transactions, Working Paper, 24 February 2011. 
69
 It should be noted that the Third Directive explicitly acknowledges this role by stating in Article 14 of the Directive 
that member states may permit that legal professionals rely on client due diligence performed by trusted 
third parties. 
70
 As discussed, entrepreneurs in Malaysia may also file incorporation documents electronically. 
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Economy Procedures (number) Time (days) 
Cost (% of income per 
capita) 
Italy 6.3 6 18.5 
Malaysia 9 17 17.5 
United States 6 6 1.4 
Source: International Finance Corporation and The World Bank, Doing Business 2011, Measuring Business Regulations 
(www.doingbusiness.org). 
 It is only to be expected that governments, in their efforts to encourage entrepreneurship and job 
creation, increasingly rely on an investigative system to obtain information about beneficial ownership in 
corporate vehicles.
71
 Arguably, such a system stands or falls with the possibility for public authorities or 
appointed investigators to have access to the necessary information. The Malaysian company law 
provisions and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia‟s Law Number 8 of 2010 on Prevention and Eradication of the 
Crime of Money Laundering contain provisions that provide for access to corporate or even beneficial 
ownership information by government authorities. Reforms in this area should be geared towards the 
improvement of intra-governmental collaborations (on both a national and an international level) to not 
only obtain and maintain accurate information about beneficial ownership of corporate vehicles, but also to 
collectively detect and deter money laundering and tax evasion.
72
 
Box 6. LegalZoom 
 
The traditional role of lawyers is vulnerable in today’s fast-changing and international business environment. 
Clearly, new players, like online service providers, are rapidly entering the market for legal services that was until 
recently destined solely to law firms. Consider the following facts. LegalZoom is an online legal document provider, 
headquartered in California that was established by Brian Lu, Brian Lee, Eddie Hartman and Robert Shapiro in 
2001. The mission behind the online provider is improving and simplifying the process of providing legal services, in 
particular the drafting of legal documents. LegalZoom also assist businesses in making choice of entity decisions. 
For instance, LegalZoom offers an LLC or Corporation Package for US$ 99.00. Since a corporation imposes 
specific incorporation and operation requirements on business parties, the LLC is probably better tailored to be sold 
as an online product. The LLC package not only includes assistance with the standard “incorporation” formalities, 
such as the clearance of the LLC name and the filing of the Articles of Association with the Secretary of State, but 
also with the customization of the Operating Agreement. LegalZoom developed a three-step process to assist their 
clients: (1) the client has to complete a relatively simple questionnaire, (2) LegalZoom will review the answers and 
create the Operating Agreement, while at the same time the Articles of Association will be filed with the Secretary of 
State, and (3) the client will receive the formation documents. The questionnaire contains questions (and 
assistance) about the preferred state of incorporation, the company name, dissolution requirements, management 
structure, transfer of ownership interests, and taxation (check-the-box). The cheaper legal services are certainly 
attractive to smaller enterprises in that they can now forgo a visit to a more expensive and time- consuming 
corporate lawyer, which charges approximately US$ 1000 for a less accessible and time-consuming service. 
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 In this respect, it is worthwhile to mention the Global Forum on Transparency and the Exchange 
of Information for Tax Purposes. OECD member countries, in the conviction that transparency and 
exchange of information on an international level was needed to deter and discourage tax evasion, initially 
established the Global Forum. Currently, the Global Forum includes more than 100 jurisdictions. 
Membership is also open to non-OECD countries that endorse the following principles: (1) commitment to 
implement the international standard on transparency and exchange of information, (2) contribution to the 
budget, and, most importantly, (3) participation in the peer review process, which consists of two phases. 
In Phase 1, the legislative and regulatory framework will be reviewed. Phase 2 focuses on a review of the 
effective application of the legal framework. Box 5 provides a summary of the main conclusions of the 
Phase 1 report on Indonesia, which was completed in September 2011. 
 Still, however effective these reviews are, an investigative system will be of limited use to 
minority investors and other stakeholders in listed companies, who, as discussed, mainly rely on publicly 
available and instantly accessible information about the control and ownership of listed companies. It is 
therefore much more important that an effective enforcement and intervention system is in place to be able 
to ensure compliance with the disclosure and reporting regimes for listed companies in a particular 
country. The next Section discusses different modalities of enforcement that are available to governments 
and investors to ensure that accurate information about the control and ownership structures of listed 
companies can be obtained. 
Box 7. Indonesian tax regime relevant to beneficial ownership and use of corporate vehicles 
 
Indonesia has a comprehensive income tax system for individuals and has concluded double tax treaties allowing 
for international exchange of information since the late 1970s. Relevant corporate bodies include companies, 
partnerships, foundations and co-operative societies. These entities have to apply for legal status and/or must 
register in the enterprise register in order to do business in Indonesia. 
 
Ownership information has to be provided when filing the annual income tax return. However, no enforcement 
provisions exist for not providing updates on ownership information in respect to foundations not carrying on 
business and in respect to the obligations on trustees of foreign trusts to keep ownership information. 
 
The issuance of bearer shares is not allowed. Trusts cannot be formed under Indonesian law, but a person in 
Indonesia may act as a trustee of a foreign trust. Such person is subject to the Anti-Money Laundering legislation 
and has to apply “know your customer” rules. 
 
The Corporate Documents Law of 1997 and the tax law together ensure that reliable accounting records, including 
underlying documentation, be kept for a period of ten years in respect to all relevant entities and arrangements. 
However, a gap exists where a foreign trust not engaged in business activities in Indonesia has a trustee resident in 
Indonesia. Banks are obliged to keep all bank information, pursuant to the Anti-Money Laundering Legislation; in 
order to obtain information held by banks the Indonesian tax authorities require the name of the taxpayer to be 
provided. 
 
Source: Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Peer Review Report on Indonesia – 




5. ENFORCEMENT AND INTERVENTION 
 As far as jurisdictions have mechanisms that make it possible to obtain access to beneficial 
ownership and control information, it is important that proper oversight and enforcement systems are 
available to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosed information. Enforcement can come in 
different forms.
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 The enforcement taxonomy as depicted in Table 7 below provides an overview of 
possible forms of enforcement relating to the disclosure of ownership and control structures. 
Table 7: Taxonomy of enforcement and intervention 
Enforcement Public  Private 
Formal (judicial) 
judicial/criminal penalties and fines 
administrative penalties and fines 
remedial orders (court, securities 
commissions, other government agencies) 
public interest dissolution/strike-off 
minority shareholder litigation (including 
derivative action) 




request for remedial action (securities 
commissions) 
public censure (securities commissions) 
public or private reprimand 
stock price decrease 
losing (foreign) investors confidence 
Source: Adapted from J. Armour, Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical Assessment. In 
Armour, J. and Payne, J. eds. Rationality in Company Law: Essays in Honour of Dan Prentice, Hart Publishing, 2009. 
 We can distinguish four modes of enforcement: (1) formal (judicial) public enforcement, (2) 
informal (non-judicial) public enforcement, (3) formal private enforcement and (4) informal private 
enforcement. It appears that jurisdictions differ dramatically in the mix of the enforcement devices that 




 There are also fundamental differences in the severity of the enforcement measures. Recall, the 
disclosure and transparency regimes in Europe. Most Member States have introduced regulations that 
require domestic and, often, foreign intermediaries or shareholders in the first and subsequent layers of the 
shareholding structure to provide information to the listed companies. If the intermediaries or shareholders 
fail to provide the information, a wide variety of enforcement measures are available in the countries, 
varying from formal private enforcement mechanisms, such as a suspension of voting rights or a freeze of 
dividends, to formal public enforcement mechanisms, such as a fine for intermediaries that do not respond 
or even the formal withdrawal of an intermediaries‟ license. 
 Indeed, the European Directives that are discussed in this paper acknowledge that the 
transparency and disclosure regimes in a corporate governance infrastructure can only be effective when 
legal rules and other institutions secure the enforcement of and compliance with the respective legal 
requirements. These Directives, however, do not prescribe particular enforcement or intervention measures 
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 See M. Roe and H. Jackson, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 
Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. 
Paper 637, 2009. 
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 See R. Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, Oxford 
University Press, 2009. 
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(let alone a sanction system to ensure compliance by controlling beneficial owners). Instead, the Directives 
order the Member States to implement an enforcement system that is effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive. If listed companies and their investors fail to report the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, 
the Takeover Bids Directive states that Member States shall determine the sanctions to be imposed for the 
infringement of the disclosure system. In a similar vein, the Transparency Directive requires that Member 
States implement measures and penalties to detect and (consistently) enforce compliance with the 
disclosure regime set out in the Directive. Moreover, it is required that Member States designate a single 
competent authority that will not only be responsible for the enforcement, but also for the international 
cooperation with other foreign authorities.
75
 The authority may disclose the penalties to the public as long 
as disclosure is proportionate and does not jeopardize the working of financial markets. 
 Obviously, cross-border cooperation between authorities that are responsible for the collection, 
disclosure and safeguarding of information about beneficial ownership and control structures play an 
important role in today‟s globalizing and internationalizing world. In order to better facilitate the exchange 
of information on a wider scale than a single internal market, such as the European Union, associations 
have emerged to set up and encourage cross-border cooperation in developing and promoting adherence to 
generally accepted standards and best-practices as well as exchange of information. One example of such 
an organization/association is the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
 IOSCO is currently considered as an organization that sets the standards for more than 95% of 
the securities markets in the world. For instance, its Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
(IOSCO Principles) offer an important benchmark to assist national regulators in their efforts to develop an 
efficient and transparent securities market. The IOSCO Principles also contain recommendations to 
mutually increase international cooperation and the sharing of both public and non-public information 
among regulators.  
 IOSCO encouraged the implementation of these recommendations by having adopted a 
multilateral memorandum of understanding (IOSCO MMoU) specifically designed to facilitate the cross-
border enforcement and information exchange among its signatories. The terms of the IOSCO MMoU 
facilitate the exchange of information and records about the identity of beneficial owners of listed 
companies and other corporate vehicles (see Paragraph 7 of the IOSCO MMoU). In this respect, the 
IOSCO MMoU arguably plays an important role in country‟s enforcement regime in that it ensures that 
investors have access to accurate, timely and cross-border beneficial ownership information. The next 
Section focuses on the public and private enforcement mechanisms, including the possibilities to exchange 
information that may exist on a country level.    
5.1 Comparative overview 
 A closer look at the beneficial ownership rules and regulations at a country level provides 
numerous examples of the enforcement and intervention instruments outlined above.  
5.1.1 Public enforcement 
 All of the jurisdictions discussed in this paper devote significant resources to public enforcement. 
In Italy, CONSOB can impose administrative fines and measures in the event that investors and companies 
are not in compliance with the disclosure regime. Moreover, CONSOB can take the following formal 
measures: (1) suspension of voting rights and (2) imposing a fine in the amount of twenty-five thousand 
Euros to two million five hundred thousand Euros. Informally, CONSOB may request the defaulting 
shareholder to provide the necessary beneficial ownership information as soon as possible. 
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 For instance, the “Money Laundering” Directive explicitly acknowledges the need for cross-border cooperation, 
including the exchange of information among FIUs, in order to obtain accurate information about the 
beneficial ownership and control structures and, more importantly, to ensure the proper compliance with 
the disclosure regime. 
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 Another “informal” approach can be found in the United States. Although Section 21 of the 
Exchange Act empowers the SEC to investigate and prosecute violators of Section 13(d) of the Exchange 
Act, in many cases all that the SEC staff needs to do is to remind delinquent filers of their obligations and 
to suggest that they make their required filings as soon as possible. When an investigation is launched, the 
first phase is usually an informal inquiry in which the SEC staff asks suspected violators and third parties 
to provide information voluntarily and to cooperate with the investigation. Such informal investigations are 
generally conducted on a confidential basis and can often be concluded without the need to launch a formal 
investigation. 
 The formal public enforcement mechanisms in Malaysia are typically made up of fines or 
imprisonment or both. Depending on the breach, the relevant authorities would be the Companies 
Commission of Malaysia or the Securities Commission, and the matter would be brought before the 
commercial division of the High Courts in Kuala Lumpur. Table 8 shows the key enforcement 
mechanisms. Interestingly, Malaysia also relies on an apparently effective informal enforcement system. 
By virtue of the powers provided to it by the Listing Requirements, Bursa Securities may for instance 
impose informal public enforcement actions such as submitting a formal request to obtain documents for 
investigation purposes from the listed companies. In the event there is a breach of the Listing 
Requirements, Bursa Securities may take or impose any actions or penalties, as it considers appropriate. 
Bursa Securities is required to notify the Securities Commission of its decisions which may include the 
issuance of a caution letter, private reprimand, public reprimand, or letters requiring compliance. The 
imposition of any one or more of the actions or penalties set out in paragraph 16.19 of the Listing 
Requirements does not preclude Bursa Securities from later taking or imposing such further actions or 
penalties, as stipulated under paragraph 16.18 of the Listing Requirements, against a listed company, as 
Bursa Securities thinks fit.
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In theory at least, the speed and flexibility of the informal public procedures are attractive measures 
for market players such as the listed companies and their investors. Not only do they benefit - from a cost 
standpoint - from lower compliance costs, but they also benefit from the inducement to settle defaults in a 
more informal setting. Of course, the preference for informal public enforcement measures does not make 
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 The Securities Commission (SC) is empowered to take any one or more of the following actions when a person is 
in default in complying with the provisions of the Capital Market & Services Act 2007 or any securities 
laws; or fails to comply with the rules of the stock exchange, written notice, guidelines issued or condition 
imposed by the SC (Section 354(1) and (3)): (1) direct the person in breach to comply with, observe, 
enforce or give effect to such rules, provisions, written notice, condition or guideline; (2) impose a penalty 
in proportion to the severity or gravity of the breach on the person in breach subject to a cap of 
RM500,000; (3) reprimand the person in breach; (4) require the person in breach to take such steps as the 
SC may direct to remedy the breach or to mitigate the effect of such breach, including making restitution to 
any other person aggrieved by such breach; (5) in the case of a promoter or a director of a corporation, in 
addition to the actions taken above, the following may also be taken by the SC: (a) imposing a moratorium 
on any dealing by the promoter or director in the securities of the corporation; or (b) issuing a public 
statement to the effect that in the SC‟s opinion, the retention of office by the director is prejudicial to 
public interest. Where the SC takes an action against any person under the rules of the stock exchange, the 
SC shall give a written notice to the stock exchange of the grounds and the proposed action to be taken 
(Section 354(6)). 
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Table 8: Enforcement in Malaysia 
Enforcement Public  Private 
Formal 
Malaysian Companies Act 1965 - failure to 
comply with substantial shareholders 
requirement: (a) fines, (b) imprisonment or 
(c) share transfer restrictions 
Capital Markets & Services Act 2007  - 
breach of disclosure requirement may lead 
to a fine or even imprisonment 
Malaysian Companies Act 1965 (Section 
181A) - Derivative action  
Informal 
Listing Requirements - caution letters / 
reprimands 
Capital Markets & Services Act 2007 - 
official directions / reprimands 
N/A 
 
5.1.2 Private enforcement 
 Private enforcement contrasts with public enforcement insofar it is initiated by private actors. The 
Company Laws or Securities Regulations within a country‟s corporate governance infrastructure usually 
allow for the listed companies or their minority investors to challenge shareholders resolutions if the 
undisclosed controlling interest in the company had the decisive vote. The federal securities laws in the 
United States provide for express remedies in favour of private parties who claim damages as a result of 
specific violations of the federal securities laws. In the United States, shareholders and companies have the 
right to bring private actions in federal court against persons that violate their Section 13(d) beneficial 
ownership reporting obligations or that commit other violations of the Exchange Act. 
 The private enforcement of the disclosure regime regarding ownership and control structures are 
arguably important to protect minority investors in the context of listed companies in a blockholder system. 
In order to bring an action for the controlling shareholder‟s breach of “fiduciary duty” to provide the 
company and its minority investors with adequate information, some jurisdictions, like Malaysia, provide 
for what is known as a “derivative suit”. From the standpoint of the defendant, the incentives for bringing 
these actions depend on the nature and character of the litigation and the size of the award. These 
derivative suits are brought by one or more shareholders in the name of the company and for the benefit of 
the company as a whole. A misappropriation of company assets claim falls within the realm of derivative 
actions. It goes without saying that these actions are often necessary to block the attempts of controlling 
shareholders to profit from self-dealing transactions with the company, since, as we have seen, the 
managers are often largely controlled by the blockholders. 
 However, derivative suits have high litigation costs and great uncertainty. The success of these 
actions depends on minority shareholders‟ access to beneficial ownership information, the incentives 
provided to lawyers and the sophistication of the court system. Even where the court system is 
sophisticated and operates in a business-friendly environment, actions involving relief for minority 
shareholders are often frustrated, due to the costly and burdensome procedures. In order to improve access 
to the derivative suit option, the Malaysian Companies Act provides for the court to make such orders it 
thinks appropriate including an order for any person to provide assistance and information to the applicant 
including to allow inspection of the company‟s books (Section 181E(1)(c)). Despite the fact that the 
Companies Act contains statutory safeguards to protect the rights and interest of minority investors, it is 
acknowledged that the effectiveness of these safeguards requires more awareness amongst shareholders in 
Malaysia with respect to their rights and remedies. 
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 In this respect, it is imperative to supplement private enforcement mechanisms with public 
procedures to enhance the protection of minority shareholders rights. Again, the use of public enforcement 
mechanisms holds out the advantages of the predictability and legal certainty of formal public enforcement 
along with the flexibility and acceptance of informal public enforcement mechanisms.  
5.1.3 Cross-border cooperation and information sharing 
 As discussed, internationalization of and innovations in financial markets call for greater 
collaboration between national securities regulators and other enforcement bodies. Because foreign 
ownership in domestic stock markets is increasing,
77
 there is an urgent need for enhanced investor 
protection through strengthened information exchange and cooperation in enforcement against misconduct 
and in supervision of financial markets and market intermediaries. It should therefore come as no surprise 
that the countries discussed in this paper are not only a member of IOSCO, but also signed the IOSCO 
MMoU. The exception is Indonesia, which is a member of IOSCO, but is in the process of seeking the 
legal authority and formal approval to become a full signatory of the IOSCO MMoU.
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 If we accept the idea that financial markets become increasingly internationally oriented and 
complex, then the introduction of information sharing “obligations” in the national laws and regulations is 
likely to further stimulate cross-border cooperation in the enforcement of rules that are designed to protect 
the interests of minority investors and other stakeholders in listed companies. Consider Section 150(2) of 
the Malaysian Securities Commission Act 1993, which provides that the Securities Commission may, upon 
receiving a written request from a foreign supervisory authority for assistance to investigate into an alleged 
breach of a legal or regulatory requirement which the foreign supervisory authority enforces or 
administers, provide assistance to the foreign supervisory authority by carrying out investigations of the 
alleged breach of the legal or regulatory requirement or provide such other assistance to the foreign 
supervisory authority as the Securities Commission sees fit.  
 Likewise, Section 24(c) of the Exchange Act in the United States allows the SEC to make non-
public information and records available to persons the SEC deems appropriate, including domestic and 
foreign counterparts, if they have a need for the information and make appropriate assurances of 
confidentiality. The SEC has adopted Rule 24c-1 under Section 24(c), which provides that the SEC can 
provide non-public information to a federal, state, local or foreign government and even to a foreign 
financial authority. Under Section 21(a)(2) of the Exchange Act, the SEC can assist a foreign supervisory 
authority if the foreign authority states that it is conducting an investigation to determine if its laws have 
been violated. The SEC may provide information in its public files, and, under Section 21(a)(2), it may 
collect information and evidence requested by the foreign securities authority. The SEC, for example, may 
compel the production of evidence and testimony on behalf of the foreign supervisory authority. Arguably, 
national legal rules designed to enable information sharing on an international level better establish mutual 
reciprocity and collaboration among national supervisory authorities. 
5.2 Key findings and main messages  
 In view of the factors discussed above, the challenge is to find the right mix of informal and 
formal public enforcement measures that encourage controlling beneficial owners to effectively make 
disclosures and inform other investors and the market about their identity and intentions. In the spirit of 
finding the right mix, it is very important to consider the introduction of a segmented enforcement 
framework. Arguably, informal enforcement mechanisms, such as “information requests” and private and 
public reprimands play an important role in this framework. The flexibility of the disclosure and 
enforcement regime has the advantage of giving governments and supervisory authorities the opportunity 
to respond quickly. More importantly, it brings them closer to the market and the business community. 
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October 2010. See also S. Ghon Rhee and J. Wang, Foreign Institutional Ownership and Stock Market 
Liquidity: Evidence from Indonesia, Working Paper, December 2008. 
78
 The Indonesian Capital Market Supervisory Agency (BAPEPAM) is listed in Appendix B of the IOSCO MMoU. 
 49 
This has the obvious benefit that governments and supervisory authorities are more inclined to engage the 
business community in their regulatory efforts, which is necessary to create effective rules.  
 Indeed, several reasons suggest that informal enforcement forms an effective means to manage 
non-compliance with disclosure and reporting rules and regulations in a globalizing and increasingly 
complex world. Particularly, informal public enforcement holds out the possibility of resolving conflicts 
through cooperative engagement involving both public agents and private companies, offering them a 
variety of softer mechanisms to manage specific problems.
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 This may result in greater consistency in 
disclosure across listed companies that will benefit minority investors and other stakeholders across the 
board. There is at least a suspicion that informal enforcement measures are likely to be more effective, 
given the complexity of investment structures pursued by beneficial owners, than direct formal 
intervention.  
 It is crucial to recall that the challenge here is to comprehend the amount of work required by 
government regulators to simply understand the impact of their intervention and its ultimate effectiveness 
on the financial market. For an enforcement system to be successful, consideration must be given to 
measures that encourage the dialogue and information sharing between supervisory authorities and private 
actors so as to ascertain greater compliance with the disclosure and reporting standards in the international 
financial marketplace. Again, the introduction of informal, non-judicial, enforcement measures is pivotal in 
this respect. The non-judicial enforcement system reduces the burden on regulators and supervisory 
authorities, is quick and effective, brings regulators and supervisory authorities closer to the business 
community, and encourages cross-border cooperation. 
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 This comparative paper has focused on disclosure and transparency regimes regarding the 
beneficial ownership and control structures employed by listed companies in a number of countries, such 
as China, France, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia and the United States. We have seen that it is vital to 
implement clear disclosure rules that require substantial beneficial owners to disclose their identity and 
sometimes even their intentions. It appears to be generally accepted that disclosures should be made if 
direct or indirect holdings of a class of securities cross a 5% threshold. Still, the definition of beneficial 
owner must be sufficiently flexible and proportionate to allow the definitions to evolve as needed to adopt 
to changes in market behavious, thereby enabling regulators and supervisory authorities to include 
investors that use innovative financial instruments only with an eye to exert control over listed companies.  
 As discussed, the focus a country‟s disclosure regime should be on control. It is therefore 
absolutely crucial that control-enhancing mechanisms are disclosed on a regular basis. For instance, in the 
United States, special control structures that deviate from the standard rule that voting rights (control) 
equals cash-flow rights (ownership), such as multiple voting shares, should be disclosed annually and 
prominently in the financial statements and on the websites of listed companies, and updated promptly if 
there are any changes. 
 Since controlling beneficial owners frequently make use of local or offshore corporate vehicles to 
hide their identity from the public and other investors, a closely related issue was also discussed, namely 
the disclosure of beneficial ownership of these corporate vehicles. This paper reported on multilateral and 
domestic initiatives to combat the misuse of corporate vehicles for illicit purposes. Evidently, there is a 
relation between the ability to hide the identity of beneficial owners from supervisory authorities and the 
use of corporate vehicles to carry out illegal activities. The incidence of these illegal activities suggests that 
this type of problem cannot be ignored and may require a comprehensive solution. However, offering a 
clear-cut and workable solution is difficult and does not appear to rise immediately to the top of 
legislatures‟ reform agendas. The reason for the reluctant attitude is clear: There is a trade-off between the 
relative ease to establish new corporate entities and the illicit use of these vehicles.  
 It is imperative that substantial beneficial owners comply with the existing disclosure rules and 
regulations that apply to listed companies. In this respect, enforcement and possibilities to intervene when 
ultimate beneficial owners fail to abide by these rules and regulations are crucial to the quality of a 
corporate governance infrastructure. We have seen that there are limitations on private enforcement actions 
by individual investors. These investors are therefore likely to resort to public enforcement actions by 
governmental agents, such as financial market regulators, or private institutions with quasi-governmental 
powers, such as stock exchanges.  
 This paper points out the importance of the informal public enforcement and intervention 
approach in providing a high level of disclosure and transparency in (emerging) financial markets. By 
choosing to informally intervene, the government is able to act in a speedy and decisive manner, thereby 
improving the corporate governance infrastructure in which companies operate. Moreover, there is at least 
a suspicion that a proportionate and flexible disclosure regime supplemented by informal public 
enforcement measures is, in the long run, more effective. Governments‟ informal interaction with listed 
companies and their investors and other stakeholders in a more informal setting will lead to a better 
understanding of the controlling owners‟ instruments and intentions. Also, it will provide better insights 
into innovative and complex ownership and control structures (such as cash-based equity derivatives) in 
the ever changing and internationalizing financial markets. In view of the factors discussed above, the 
challenge is thus to find the right mix of informal and formal enforcement mechanisms that encourage 
beneficial owners to effectively make disclosures and inform the company, other investors and the market 
about the control structure and their intentions.  
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 In this comparative paper, we have thus set out five important recommendations for improving 
the disclosure and reporting regime for beneficial owners in listed companies and for developing incentives 
for these owners to comply with the legal and regulatory measures: 
1. A good corporate governance infrastructure should increase the involvement of large investors 
and at the same time provide legal protection for minority investors and other stakeholders. 
Clearly, minority investor protection will be challenging without access to reliable information 
about the ownership, including the identity of the controlling owners, and control structures of 
listed companies. Still, despite clear benefits, a disclosure and reporting regime has its costs as 
well. We have seen that the design of a balanced and proportionate disclosure and reporting 
regime poses something of a challenge. For instance, in order to have practical relevance, the 
disclosure and reporting requirements should be complemented with de jure and de facto 
investigation and enforcement mechanisms.  
2. In order to provide minority investors and other stakeholders with the necessary information 
about the beneficial ownership and control structures of listed companies, the ultimate beneficial 
owners should comply with clear and accessible rules that oblige them to provide transparency in 
the different layers of shareholdings. Overly stringent rules and regulations could have a 
counterproductive effect. Indeed, disproportionate transparency requirements not only discourage 
engagement of outside blockholders, such as institutional investors, but also exacerbate the 
information overload that already exists in the financial markets. The reason why flexibility and 
proportionality must prevail in a country‟s disclosure and reporting regime is twofold. Firstly, a 
flexible regime, either by offering the possibility to determine beneficial ownership on a “case-
by-case” basis or by creating opt-in rules for regulators, has the benefit of making the disclosure 
and reporting regime adaptable to technological and market changes. Secondly, and related to 
this, a flexible regime ensures that beneficial owners that use derivative arrangements to seek 
control over a listed company can be better targeted. 
3. Disclosure and reporting is particularly important when it involves information about control of 
listed companies. It is therefore necessary that disclosure rules and regulations require 
blockholders to report the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. Tightening the disclosure 
regime will not only lead to more transparency, but will at the same time decrease the use (and 
popularity) of these mechanisms. Still, the use of control-enhancing mechanisms in younger 
high-tech and family-owned listed companies seems to suggest that the market is able to 
distinguish between companies that legitimately and proportionally implement control 
mechanisms and companies with disproportional or inefficient structures.  
4. Minority investors and other stakeholders who have an interest in pursuing an investigation in the 
control structures in listed companies could turn to the rules that protect society against money 
laundering and financing of terrorism. Because controlling beneficial owners usually use national 
and/or offshore corporate vehicles to hide their identity, anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism 
financing legislation arguably assist minority investors in their effort to reconstruct the control 
structure of a listed company. However, even the most effective anti-money laundering and anti-
terrorist financing system – which includes a sophisticated cross-agency collaboration framework 
– be of limited use to minority investors and other stakeholders in listed companies who have to 
rely on publicly available and instantly accessible information about the control and ownership of 
listed companies.  
5. The final claim is that it is imperative that an enforcement and intervention system is in place to 
ensure compliance with the disclosure and reporting regime in a particular country. In order to be 
effective, the disclosure and reporting regime should be supplemented with a mix of public and 
private investigation and enforcement mechanisms that encourage beneficial owners to make 
regular and timely disclosures about the control structure and their identity and intentions. In the 
spirit of finding the right mix, governments should ideally introduce and develop non-judicial, 
informal enforcement mechanisms, such as “information requests” and private and public 
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reprimands. In this light, it is also important that legislatures, regulators and other rule-making 
agents support international collaboration activities and cross-border exchange of information, 
such as the adoption of IOSCO‟s multilateral memorandum of understanding. To be sure, 
material information about controlling beneficial ownership is often available through the stock 
exchange‟s or supervisory authority‟s website. However, the access to non-public information 
could be equally important in the investigation process. Therefore, it is argued that the 
implementation of a cross-border information-sharing regime is key to the proper enforcement of 
a country‟s disclosure rules and requirements. 
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ANNEX: QUESTIONNAIRE: THE FIRST STEP IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE 
DISCLOSURE OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
